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YOUR MONEY OR YOUR SPEECH: THE
CHILDREN'S INTERNET PROTECTION ACT AND
THE CONGRESSIONAL ASSAULT ON THE FIRST

AMENDMENT IN PUBLIC LIBRARIES
STEVEN D. HINCKLEY*
I. INTRODUCTION

The federal government is painfully conflicted about the Internet.
Faced with compelling evidence of a growing "digital divide" in our
society that threatens to leave those without the personal means to obtain
computer and Internet access unprepared to compete in the emerging
global information age,' Congress enacted a sweeping change to the
* C Steven D. Hinckley. Associate Dean for Library and Information Technology and
Professor of Law, University of South Carolina. I would like to thank the members of the University of
South Carolina School of Law faculty for their support and encouragement. Special thanks go to David
Owen, James Underwood, Patrick Hubbard, and Philip Lacy for their invaluable review and comment
on drafts of this Article, and to John Montgomery, Marie Reilly, and John Lopatka for their advice and
counsel. In addition, I thank the faculty and staff of the University of South Carolina School of Law's
Coleman Karesh Law Library for their patience and support, and Julie Flaming and Amanda Adler for
their thorough and thoughtful research assistance. Finally, I thank Sara Elliott Krome, without whose
assistance and guidance this project could not have been completed.
1. In a 1995 study of Americans' computer ownership and usage, the U.S. Department of
Commerce found a direct correlation between household income and ethnicity on the one hand, and
the rate of household computer ownership and Interet access on the other. The study concluded that
the nation's poorest families, those with household incomes of less than $10,000 per year, particularly
those living in rural locations, were as much as ten times less likely to have either a computer in their
homes or to have any personal means to connect to the Interet than families living in the same regions
with household incomes of more than $50,000 per year. The study also found that Blacks and
Hispanics, regardless of income, were three to four times less likely to own a computer or to have
home access to the Internet than Caucasians. See United States Dep't of Commerce, Nat'l Telecomms.
& Info. Admin., Falling Through the Net: A Survey of the "Have Nots " in Rural and Urban America
(1995), Tables 2 & 5, available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/fallingthru.html. The Department
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nation's telecommunications policy in 1996 intended to begin closing that
gap. With its creation of the Universal Service Fund for schools and
libraries 2-the so-called "E-Rate fund"-Congress moved toward making
a national commitment to affordable and ubiquitous Internet access as it
had done over sixty years earlier when, in support of universal telephone
service, Congress mandated discounted service for those unable to afford
it and devised a funding source from which telephone companies could be
reimbursed for the discounts provided. 3 Since the E-rate program's
inception, over $10 billion has been distributed to support requests for
telecommunications services, Internet access, and internal network
connections in schools and libraries, with the emphasis on institutions in
the nation's most economically disadvantaged communities. 4 Studies of
of Commerce tracked changes in the digital divide in four subsequent reports released between 1998
and 2002. While these reports show that the per capita rate of computer ownership and Internet access
among the nation's poor and minorities has gradually improved since 1995, the percentage gap
between the information "haves" and "have-nots" has actually widened during those years. See United
States Dep't of Commerce, Nat'l Telecomms. & Info. Admin., Falling Through the Net I: New Data
on the Digital Divide (1997), available at littp://www.ntia.doc.gov/ ntiahome/net2/falling.html; United
States Dep't of Commerce, Nat'l Telecomms. & Info. Admin., Falling Through the Net: Defining the
Digital Divide (1999), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/fttn99/fttn.pdf; United States
Dep't of Commerce, Nat'l Telecomms. & Info. Admin., Falling Through the Net: Toward Digital
Inclusion (2000), available at http://search.ntia.doc.gov/pdf/fttn00.pdf; United State Dep't of
Commerce, Nat'l Telecomms. & Info. Admin., A Nation Online: How Americans Are Expanding
Their Use of the Internet (2002), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/dn/
anationonline2.pdf. But see Stephen Labaton, New F.C.C. Chief Would Curb Agency Reach, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 7, 2001, at CI (reporting on the inaugural press conference of President Bush's F.C.C.
Chairman Michael K. Powell in which he disputed use of the phrase "digital divide," calling it instead
a "Mercedes divide" because it is being perpetuated by people who would like to have something that
they cannot afford).
2. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (amending, inter
alia, 47 U.S.C. § 254).
3. The federal government introduced its Universal Service Program (Universal Service) with
the passage of the Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, Title I, § I, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 47
U.S.C. § 151 (2002)). Originally enacted to ensure affordable phone service to all Americans, it is a
natural extension of the original legislation's goal of universal access to telecommunications media
that the Communication Act of 1934 is now being invoked to provide the same assurance of access to
the Interet for all. Universal Service has garnered a great deal of criticism from those who would
reform or eliminate the program. See generally James Alleman et al., Universal Service: The Poverty
of Policy, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 849 (2000) (calling for reforms in the current Universal Service model
that the author suggests is now outdated and incapable of functioning in the current
telecommunications market); Robert M. Frieden, Universal Service: When Technologies Converge
and Regulatoiy Models Diverge, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 395 (2000) (same); Gregory L. Rosston &
Bradley S. Wimmer, The ABC's of Universal Service: Arbitrage, Big Bucks, and Competition, 50
HASTINGS L.J. 1585 (1999) (same).
4. Universal Service Administrative Company, 2000 Annual Report 4, available at
http://www.universalservice.org/reports/2000/. Funds collected and distributed to support universal
service requests are administered by The Universal Service Administrative Company, an independent,
not-for-profit organization created in 1997 under regulations promulgated by the Federal
Communication Commission. As of August 7, 2002, $724,133,884 had been committed for that year's
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the program's impact confirm that, by making Internet access possible at
schools and libraries, particularly in high-poverty and high-minority
districts, E-rate universal service discounts are meeting congressional
objectives by helping close the gap between those who can afford private
online access and those who cannot. 5 Having set in motion a program that
is succeeding in bringing equality of Internet access to all Americans,
many in Congress seem now to regret what they have unleashed. As online
activity has increased, a perception has arisen in Congress that the Internet
is a dangerous place, full of objectionable content that the government
must control at all costs, ostensibly because uncontrolled Internet access,
particularly to sexual material, is "harmful" to children.6 Despite the near
total absence of any credible research drawing an absolute correlation
between exposure of children to controversial media images and resulting
lasting harm, 7 the image of the Internet as a "red light district" actively
corrupting minors has been carefully nurtured by those who would censor
it.,
E-rate discounts, 5.3 1% of which ($35,432,764) was in response to requests from libraries and library
consortia. The vast majority of the 2002 commitments (81% or $584,798,041) were targeted for school
districts. See Universal Service Administrative Company, Funding Commitments: Cumulative
National Data-Funding Year 2002, at http://www.sl.universalservice.org/funding/y5/national.asp
(last visited Oct. 1, 2002).
5. See Michael J. Puma et al., E-Rate and the Digital Divide: A Preliminary Analysis From the
Integrated Studies of Educational Technology 98-100, THE URBAN INSTITUTE AND U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF EDUCATION, OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY, PLANNING AND EDUCATION SERVICE,
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION DIVISION, available at http://www.ed.gov/offices/OUS/

PES/erate_fr.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2002).
6. A search of the Congressional Record since 1996 yields numerous comments by House and
Senate members tempering their enthusiasm for the Intemet as an information source with their
concern that the Internet is a dangerous place for children. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. S1646 (daily ed.
Mar. 7, 1996) (statement by Sen. James Exon) ("[T]here are, indeed, real dangers on the Internet,
especially for children and especially with the interactive computer services that are available .... ");
144 CONG. REC. H9909 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of Rep. Sheila Jackson-Lee) ("Although
the Web can be a fantastic vehicle for enriching our lives, we must also keep unwanted sexual imagery
and pornography from invading our children's lives."); 146 CONG. REC. S5647 (daily ed. June 22,
2000) (statement by Sen. John McCain) ("[S]tatistics ... represent both the tremendous promise and
the exponential danger that wiring America's children to the Internet poses."); 146 CONG. REC. H9535
(daily ed. Oct. 10, 2000) (statement by Rep. Virgil Goode) ("As more and more Americans are
utilizing the Interet and many children in this country have access to the Internet, it is important that
we raise awareness to the dangers that the Internet can pose, especially to children.").
7. See Catherine J. Ross, Anything Goes: Examining the State's Interest in ProtectingChildren
from Controversial Speech, 53 VAND. L. REV. 427, 504 (2000) ("Although it is nearly impossible to
find an iota of evidence that controversial speech about sex harms children, speech concerned with
sexuality is the content most commonly subject to regulation on their behalf .... "). See also
MARJORIE HEINS, NOT IN FRONT OF THE CHILDREN: "INDECENCY,"

CENSORSHIP, AND THE

INNOCENCE OF YOUTH 243-53 (2001) (summarizing contemporary social science research questioning
any lasting harm to children exposed to sexual or violent media images).
8. This lurid description of the Internet has often been repeated in remarks by members of
Congress since the mid-1990s. See, e.g., 144 CONG. REC. H9907 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of
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As a result, virtually every pro-Internet initiative enacted by Congress
since the mid-1990s has been checked by even more aggressive legislative
efforts to reduce the perceived dangers of the online world. Initially, those
efforts took the form of direct statutory proscriptions, not just of Internet
content that legislative sponsors described as "obscene," but also of
content that is merely "indecent" or "patently offensive." Informed quickly
and forcefully by the courts that direct regulation of Internet speech could
not withstand constitutional scrutiny, 9 Congress creatively turned to
indirect methods to make the Internet "safe for children."
The vehicle they chose was the Children's Internet Protection Act °
(CIPA), a statute that places conditions on distribution of the very federal
funds earmarked under the E-rate program and similar programs to make
the Internet accessible in schools and libraries. To receive those funds,
institutions must agree to place, on all their computers capable of
accessing the Internet, software filters that block access to visual
depictions that are obscene, are child pornography, or are harmful to
minors (when accessed by a minor)." Proponents of the law see the
contingency placed on funds offered to schools and libraries as a routine
use of the congressional spending power; they maintain that the legislation
is a means rationally related to the government's legitimate purpose of
ensuring that funds used to connect children to2 the Internet cannot be used
to expose minors to harmful online materials.'
As compelling and intuitively persuasive as that may sound, CIPA is,
in fact, one of the most sweeping restrictions on constitutionally protected
Rep. Michael G. Oxley) ("Children cannot safely learn in a virtual red light district."); 143 CONG.
REC. S12148 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1997) (statement of Sen. Daniel Coats) ("Internet Access Providers are
pulling in the big bucks, providing access to the red light district."); 142 CONG. REc. 2030 (1996)
(statement of Sen. Daniel Coats) ("[F]oul material on the interet ... takes the worst excesses of [a]
red-light district and places it directly into a child's bedroom, on the computer their parents bought
them to help them with their homework."); 141 CONG. REC. 3203 (1995) (statement of Sen. James
Exon) ("[T]he information superhighway should not become a red light district.").
9. For discussion of Congress's direct restrictions on availability of "indecent" or "offensive"
material on the Internet, and their failure to pass constitutional scrutiny, see infra Part II.A regarding
the Communications Decency Act of 1996 and Part II.B regarding the Child Online Protection Act.
10. Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA), 47 U.S.C.A. § 254(h) (Supp. 2001); 20 U.S.C.
§ 9134 (Supp. 2001).
11. See infra Part Ill.B for statutory requirements of CIPA.
12. 146 CONG. REc. S5646 (daily ed. June 22, 2000) (statement by Sen. John McCain) ("I am
not advocating censorship. The fact is that when Federal dollars are used to wire schools and libraries
in America, then it seems to me the schools and libraries have an obligation to provide Internet filters
and use them according to community standards ....
");144 CONG. REc. S519 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1998)
(statement by Sen. McCain) ("Once a school or library certifies that it will use a filtering system, they
will be eligible to receive universal service fund subsidies for Internet access. If schools and libraries
do not so certify, they will not be eligible to receive universal service fund-subsidized discounts.").
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speech ever invoked by the United States government disingenuously
presented as an uncontroversial funding decision. By mandating the use of
technology that cannot effectively eliminate obscenity and child
pornography without compromising a great deal of protected speech, 13 and
by attempting to achieve indirectly content restrictions that the courts have14
held Congress cannot accomplish through direct statutory proscriptions,
CIPA offends the First Amendment as surely as any prior failed attempt
by the legislature to restrict Internet speech. Despite the great latitude
granted to Congress under the spending power to make federal fund
allocation decisions,' 5 that power is significantly limited when it is used to
control the content of speech. This is particularly true in environments
such as public libraries, where adults have a right to engage in speech that
is constitutionally protected for them, but that in the hands of minors
would have no such protections.' 6
It is in the public library context that CIPA has faced its initial First
Amendment challenge. A month before the new law's April 2001
implementation date, a group of public libraries and their patrons, library
associations, and Internet publishers filed suit,' 7 pursuant to CIPA's
provisions for expedited judicial review,' 8 in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.' 9 The plaintiffs alleged that
the conditions placed on federal funding under CIPA are facially
unconstitutional because they compel public libraries to violate the First
Amendment rights of their patrons, and because CIPA unconstitutionally

13. See infra notes 420-33 and accompanying text for a discussion regarding the ineffectiveness
of filters.
14. See infra Part II.A-B.
15. See infra Part IV.A for a discussion ofjudicial deference to congressional spending power.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 43-51 for a discussion of variable obscenity standards for
adults and minors.
17. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 414-16 (E.D. Pa. 2002)
(listing the plaintiffs in each category). Although schools receive funds from two of the federal
funding sources made conditional by CIPA, the current constitutional challenge of the statute covers
only its impact on public libraries. As a result, this Article, like the current case, does not consider
CIPA's constitutionality as applied to schools. Filtering Intemet content in schools raises its own
unique and troublesome constitutional difficulties. For a discussion of some of these issues, see
generally Kelley Baker, Public Schools and the Internet, 79 NEB. L. REv. 929 (2000), and Kathleen
Conn, ProtectingChildren From Internet Harm (Again): Will the Children's Internet ProtectionAct
Survive Judicial Scrutiny? 153 WEST'S EDUC. L. REP. 469 (2001) (each analyzing the constitutionality
of the Children's Internet Protection Act with emphasis placed on CIPA's application in public
schools).
18. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, Appendix D § 1741, 114
Stat. 2763A-351-52 (2000). The statute calls for any constitutional challenge to be heard "by a
district court of three judges." Id. § 1741 (a).
19. Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
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conditions receipt of federal funds on the relinquishment of libraries' own
First Amendment rights. 20 On May 31, 2002, a three-judge panel held, in
American Library Association v. United States,21 that CIPA is facially
invalid because no public library complying with the statute's Internet
filtering requirement could do so without blocking a substantial amount of
speech that its patrons have a First Amendment right to receive. 22 The
district court issued an order permanently enjoining the federal
government from withholding funds from public libraries for failure to
comply with CIPA conditions,23 but this order is surely not the final
chapter concerning the constitutionality of the law. Perhaps anticipating
rough sledding at the district court level and not wishing to waste time
with an intermediate appeal, Congress conveniently built into CIPA a
provision for direct review by the Supreme Court of any district court
finding that the statute is unconstitutional.2 4 Revealingly, Congress made
any findings adverse to its position reviewable "as a matter of right,"
leaving the Supreme Court little option but to accept the case in the
October 2002 term.25
A full understanding of the issues likely to guide the Supreme Court
when it ultimately decides CIPA's fate requires a review of the history of
Congress's attempts to restrict content on the Internet, the judicial reaction
to each of those efforts before CIPA's enactment, and Congress's rationale
and support for CIPA. Part II of this Article places CIPA in context by
reviewing Congress's early attempts to directly control Internet speech
26
content through the passage of the Communications Decency Act (CDA)
and the Child Online Protection Act (COPA) 27 and the judicial reaction

20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 407 (enumerating plaintiffs' constitutional claims).
Id.
Id.at496.
Id. (explaining that school libraries are still compelled to use filtering or lose their E-rate and

LSTA funds). See discussion of E-rate and LSTA funds infra Part III.B.
24. The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 200l, supra note 18, reads, in pertinent part:

Appellate Review.-Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an interlocutory or final
judgment, decree, or order of the court of three judges ... holding this title or an amendment
made by this title, or any provision thereof, unconstitutional shall be reviewable as a matter
of rightby direct appeal to the Supreme Court.

Id. (emphasis added).
25. Had the three-judge panel in the CIPA challenge ruled that the statute was constitutional, the
library community and other challengers of the Act would not have had a similar appeal as a matter of
right to the Supreme Court. Rather, it appears that they, unlike the government, would have had to

apply for certiorari and take their chances that the Supreme Court would grant their request for
review.
26. Communications Decency Act (CDA) of 1996, § 502. 47 U.S.C. § 223 (Supp. V 1999).

27. Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231).
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that greeted attempts to enforce each of those Acts. Whether through
constitutional naivete or legislative hubris, Congress seriously
underestimated the difficulty it would have controlling this new medium;
the courts met congressional attempts to regulate the Internet with the
development of a line of First Amendment cases that have firmly placed
online communications within the ambit of protected speech.
Part III examines Congress's strategic shift away from direct
proscriptions of online content and toward an attempt to control Internet
speech indirectly through its spending power. This section reviews the
resulting legislative development and implementation of CIPA and
analyzes Congress's attempts to portray CIPA as a routine use of its
spending power.
Part IV explores Congress's use of its spending power as a regulatory
tool. It reviews lines of cases addressing limits on the congressional
spending power, conditional funding, and the intersection of the spending
power and the First Amendment. It concludes that Congress's attempt to
recast CIPA's central purpose as a routine use of its spending power rather
than as a direct regulation of speech content must fail because the ultimate
effect on protected speech content is no less profound than if it had been
included in a direct statutory mandate to filter. Part IV further concludes
that the proper standard of review of CIPA's conditions is strict scrutiny.
Finally, Part V applies strict First Amendment scrutiny to the
conditions imposed by CIPA on public libraries.2 8 Part V and this Article
conclude that the method chosen by the government in CIPA to regulate
content on the Internet impermissibly undermines the essential nature and
purpose of libraries as providers of multiple points of view and thus
contravenes the First Amendment rights of both public libraries and their
users.

II. CONGRESS'S ATTEMPTS TO CONTROL INTERNET SPEECH DIRECTLY
Congress's initial attempts to control Internet content came in the form
of two assaults proscribing broad categories of online speech through
direct statutory measures. Both pieces of legislation were greeted with a
level of constitutional scrutiny that proved to be their undoing. The
following review of the rise and fall of the CDA and COPA shows why
Congress was left searching for less vulnerable means of applying existing

28. Because the purpose of schools and school libraries is substantially different than the purpose
of public libraries and libraries in institutions of higher education, this Article does not address the
constitutional implications of CIPA relative to schools.
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obscenity law to the Internet, a communications medium that, by virtue of
its unique qualities and characteristics, resists the application of traditional
speech content controls developed for other media.
A. The Communications Decency Act of 1996
In its first effort to directly control Internet content, Congress enacted
the CDA. 2 9 Not satisfied with a statute prohibiting the online transmission
of obscenity and child pornography, 30 neither of which have First
Amendment protection regardless of the transmission medium used,31
Congress embarked on a far higher-risk constitutional strategy that it
hoped would shield minors from all online speech that it deemed harmful
to them, regardless of its First Amendment status relative to adults.
Specifically, Congress sought to extend the reach of the CDA to the
transmission of two types of speech protected for adults by making it a
criminal offense for anyone 32 to knowingly transmit "indecent" materials
to anyone under eighteen years of age, 33 or to transmit any type of

29. See supra note 26.
30. Transmitting obscenity and child pornography is already prohibited by federal law. See 18
U.S.C. §§ 1464-1465 (criminalizing transmission of obscenity); 18 U.S.C §§ 2251-2252 (criminalizing
transmission of child pornography).
31. Obscene material is not protected by the First Amendment. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15, 24 (1973) (ruling that a work may be subject to state regulation when (a) "the 'average person,
applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to
prurient" sexual interests; (b) the work portrays sexual conduct in a "patently offensive way" as
defined by applicable state law; and (c) the work, taken as a whole, has no serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value).
Similarly, child pornography is not protected by the First Amendment. See New York v. Ferber,
458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (modifying the Miller standard in the case where a minor is visually depicted
as engaged in lewd sexual acts, as defined by applicable state law). In such cases, the material need not
be found to appeal to the prurient interests of the average person; the sexual conduct depicted need not
be portrayed in a patently offensive manner; and the material at issue need not be considered as a
whole. Id. at 764. See also Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990) (holding that states have such a
strong interest in protecting children from the abuse that can stem from mere possession of child
pornography that they can "constitutionally proscribe the possession and viewing" of such material).
But cf Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 122 S. Ct. 1389 (2002) (refusing to extend the
definition of child pornography to sexually explicit images that appear to depict actual children but
are, in fact, virtual (computer generated) images).
32. Congress clearly intended that the statute apply to all online transmissions, not just those by
commercial purveyors of pornography. See 141 CONG. REc. S8089 (daily ed. June 9, 1995). Unlike
other obscenity statutes and Congress's attempt to control "dial-a-porn" enacted or under consideration
at the time, CDA sponsor Senator James Exon assured his colleagues that "there would be no
noncommercial loophole in the new provisions."). 141 CONG. REC. 15503 (1995).
33. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (2001) states in pertinent part that:
Whoever(1) in interstate or foreign communications-
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communication, in a manner that is available to a person under eighteen
years of age, that depicts sexual content in a manner that is "patently
offensive as measured by contemporary community standards. 3 4
Apparently anticipating difficulty in gaining judicial approval of this
approach, Congress attempted to insulate the statute from constitutional
challenge by including affirmative defenses for those who restricted
minors' access to the proscribed materials by requiring that recipients of
such offensive content verify their age through the use of a credit card or
other adult identification information. 35 Congress also provided an
affirmative defense for those content providers who imposed other "good
faith" access restrictions.36
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the American
Library Association (ALA) mounted an immediate challenge to the CDA
in ACLU v. Reno (Reno /),37 contending that the "indecency" clause in
§ 223(a)(1) and the "patently offensive" clause in § 223(d) could not
withstand First Amendment scrutiny, as they were too vague regarding the
categories of speech regulated and were subject to overly broad
application. 38 Agreeing with the plaintiffs, a three-judge panel of the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
preliminarily enjoined enforcement of the CDA.39 In response, the
(B) by means of a telecommunications device knowingly(i) makes, creates, or solicits, and
(ii) initiates the transmission of,
any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication which is obscene
or indecent, knowing that the recipient of the communication is under 18 years of age,
regardless of whether the maker of such communication placed the call or initiated the
communication;
(2) [or] knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under his control to be used for
any activity prohibited in paragraph (1) with the intent that it be used for such activity,
shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
Id. (emphasis added).
34. 47 U.S.C. § 233(d) (2001).
35. 47 U.S.C. § 223(e)(5)(B) (2001).
36. 47 U.S.C. § 223(e)(5)(A) (2001). The CDA does not specify which measures taken to
prevent minors' access to the materials proscribed by the Act would give rise to an affirmative defense
under this subsection. Instead, § 223(e)(5)(A) generally describes qualifying access control measures
as those that are "taken, in good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate" to restrict minors'
access, including the use of "any method which is feasible under available technology." Id.
37. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). The ACLU
and the ALA were joined by dozens of Internet service providers, online publishers, and other parties
interested in the future of online communications. Id. See 521 U.S. at 861 nn.27-28 for complete lists
of plaintiffs joining the ACLU and the ALA.
38. 929 F. Supp. at 828-29.
39. Id. at 883.
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government appealed to the Supreme Court under expedited review
provisions in the Act.4 °
In Reno v. ACLU (Reno JJ) 4 1 the Supreme Court affirmed the district
court's opinion, finding the CDA's constitutional infirmities to be
numerous and the government's reliance on a number of the Court's
obscenity precedents to be flawed.42 In defending Congress's attempts to
regulate indecent and patently offensive speech that it felt could be
harmful to minors, the government argued that the Court's holdings in
Ginsberg v. New York 43 and FCCv. Pacifica Foundation44 provided ample
constitutional support for the validity of the CDA.4 5 In both cases, the
Court had fashioned theories designed to give the state great latitude to
protect minors from speech it deemed indecent and harmful to them, even
if that same speech would be fully protected for adults by the First
Amendment.46
Ginsbergupheld a New York statute making it illegal to sell to minors
material that the state legislature had classified as obscene for minors,
even if the same material would not be obscene for adults. 47 In so doing,
the Court crafted a "variable obscenity" rule in which material that is fully
protected for adults under the First Amendment can lose that protection
when it is distributed to minors. The Ginsberg Court pointed to an
"independent interest in the well-being of its youth" as the basis for a
state's decision concerning what is obscene for minors48 and required only
that it be based on a legislature's rational belief that 49minors accessing the
proscribed material would be harmed if exposed to it.
In Pacifica, the Court had upheld sanctions that the Federal
Communication Commission (FCC) levied against a radio station for

40. The expedited review provisions in the Computer Decency Act were virtually identical with
those used in the Children's Internet Protection Act. See supra notes 24-25.
41. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
42. Id. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 174 (1999). Professor

Lessig observed that the Communications Decency Act "practically impaled itself on the First
Amendment." Id.
43. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
44. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
45. Reno 11,
521 U.S. at 864-68.
46. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 636 ( .'Because of the state's exigent interest in preventing distribution
to children of objectionable material, it can exercise its power to protect the health, safety, welfare, and
morals of its community by barring the distribution to children of books recognized to be suitable for
adults."') (quoting Bookcase, Inc., v. Bioderick, 18 N.Y.2d 71, 75); Pacifica,438 U.S. at 749 ("[T]he
government's interest in the 'well-being of its youth' and in supporting 'parents' claim to authority in
their own household' justified the regulation of otherwise protected expression.").
47. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 634.
48. Id. at 640.
49. Id. at 643.
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broadcast medium.58 Unlike the Internet, where a "series of affirmative
steps" is required to obtain specific online content, media broadcasts
containing unwelcome content typically come without warning and are
received, "even by those too young to read," without any affirmative
preliminary actions taken by the listener. 59 Despite the attractiveness of the
Ginsberg and Pacifica holdings to the government in Reno I, the Court
utterly rejected their applicability and utility as bases for saving the
CDA.6 °
In its attempt to cast the widest possible net over speech that it believed
to be "indecent" and "patently offensive," Congress failed to define
explicitly the term "indecent" within the statute, leaving potential conflicts
between those terms unresolved. The government argued that the CDA
was no more vague than the Court's obscenity standard developed in
Miller v. California6 1 because both regulate works that present sexual
material in a "patently offensive" manner.62 This argument ignores that the
Miller obscenity test contains two other prongs that interrelate with, and
narrow, the "patently offensive" prong developed there. 63 Therefore, the
government's argument that Miller nullified the respondents' vagueness
argument was dismissed by the Court with the statement that "[j]ust
because a definition including three limitations is not vague, it does not
64
follow that one of those limitations, standing by itself, is not vague."
Indeed, the Court's discomfort with the prospect of speech restrictions
based only on juries deciding that speech is "patently offensive" according
to community standards, without also having that speech tested for lack of
prurient interest and for some type of serious value as required under the

58. Id. at 867.
59. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-49.
60. Reno II,
521 U.S. at 875 ("It is true that we have repeatedly recognized the governmental
interest in protecting children from harmful materials [citing Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639 and Pacifica,
438 U.S. at 749]. But that interest does not justify an unnecessarily broad suppression of speech to
adults.").
61. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). The Miller test for obscenity, which is still used today, rests on the
following three prongs:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards" would find
that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest;
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.
Id. at 24 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
62. 521 U.S. at 873.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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broadcasting comedian George Carlin's "Filthy Words" monologue on the
public airwaves at a time in the afternoon when its repeated use of words
dealing with excretory functions, sexual activities and sexual organs
would likely be heard by children in the audience. 50 The FCC had ruled
that the broadcast's content was "patently offensive" at the time of day it
was aired, and that the monologue was indecent "as broadcast." 51 The
Pacifica Court held that, in limited, specialized contexts (such as
broadcasting), the government could regulate the time, place, and manner
in which even constitutionally protected sex-oriented speech content can
be transmitted if it finds such action necessary to protect children from
exposure to harmful materials.
In Reno II, the Court rejected the government's reliance on Ginsberg
and Pacifica. The government argued that the New York statute upheld in
Ginsberg and the FCC order upheld in Pacifica were analogous to the
CDA because they all seek to regulate and control minors' exposure to
indecent, if not obscene, speech. 3 In fact, the statute upheld in Ginsberg
was far narrower in scope than the CDA. Describing the breadth of the
CDA's coverage as "wholly unprecedented,, 54 the Court excoriated
Congress for failing to limit the statute's application to commercial
speech 55 and for ignoring the right of parents to consent to their children
gaining access to the speech in question, neither of which was omitted
from the statute tested in Ginsberg.6 The Court also recognized that,
unlike the statute in Ginsberg, the CDA did not adequately define the
standard to be used in determining what speech is indecent or patently
offensive, and further expressed concern that Congress had made the CDA
applicable to all under the age of eighteen rather than under the age of
seventeen, as provided in the New York statute. 7
Similarly, in rejecting the comparison between the CDA and the FCC
order upheld in Pacifica, the Reno II Court pointed out the narrowness of
the latter ruling, which applied to one particular program on a particular

50. Pacifica,438 U.S. at 751.
51. Id. at 731-32.
52. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749-50 ("[T]he government's interest in the .'well-being of its youth"'
..justified the regulation of otherwise protected expression. The ease with which children may obtain
access to broadcast material, coupled with the concerns recognized in Ginsberg, amply justify special
treatment of indecent broadcasting.").
53. 521 U.S. at 864.
54. Reno 11, 521 U.S. at 877.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 865.
57. Id. at 865-67.
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Miller test, left the Court with the inescapable conclusion that the CDA's
use of the terms "indecent" and "patently offensive" were impermissibly
vague and overbroad to stand alone as a means of regulating speech.6 5
Despite an acknowledged governmental interest in protecting children
from exposure to harmful materials, 66 the CDA's attempted proscription of
these vague categories of speech could not be applied without
compromising a great deal of speech that adults have a constitutional right
to receive and share with others.67
As a last line of defense against the claim that anything that could not
be safely viewed by a child could be found illegal under the CDA, the
government pointed to a number of affirmative defenses provided under
the Act to shield from prosecution those attempting to direct indecent or
patently offensive speech to adults. 68 Despite the government's
unsubstantiated claims that content ratings, software filters, and age
verification programs could be effectively used to restrict children from
gaining access to the proscribed speech, the Court recognized that no
technological measure had yet been developed that provided unerring
perfection at shielding children from objectionable content while at the
same time allowing adults to gain access to that same speech. 69 Taking
note of the staggering number of Internet users worldwide,7 ° the myriad
online communications modalities available to those users regardless of
65. Id. at 870-74. The Court recognized that Congress's attempt to create a "community
standard" based on the terms "indecent" and "patently offensive" was so broad that it would have
almost certainly encompassed "large amounts of non-pornographic material with serious educational
or other value" (e.g., discussions about prison rape, sexual orientation, safe sex practices, artistic
images that include nude subjects, and arguably the card catalog of the Carnegie Library). Id. at 87778.
66. See, e.g., Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639; Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (recognizing that "the
government's interest in the 'well-being of its youth' ... justified the regulation of otherwise protected
expression").
67. Reno 11, 521 U.S. at 874 ("[T]he CDA effectively suppresses a large amount of speech that
adults have a constitutional right to receive and to address to one another."). Here, the Court merely
follows its long-standing rule that adults have the right, under the First Amendment, to access
"[s]exual expression which is indecent but not obscene." Id. (quoting Sable Communications of Cal.,
Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989)).
68. 47 U.S.C. §§ 223(e)(5)(A)-(B) (2001).
69. Reno 1l, 521 U.S. at 876-77.
70. "The Government estimates that '[a]s many as 40 million people use the Internet today, and
that figure is expected to grow to 200 million by 1999."' Id. at 870. Despite the difficulty in measuring
the number of Internet users at any given time, it is clear that these numbers are now significantly
dated. As of September 2001, the Intemet-use measurement firm of Nielsen/NetRatings placed the
number of Americans who use the Internet at least once a month at 115.2 million and the number of
Americans with Internet access, either at home or at work, at 176.5 million. See Susan Stellin, More
Americans Online, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2001, at C7.
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their age,7 and the absence of any truly effective online age verification
method, the Court concluded that the CDA could not be implemented
without severely chilling the constitutionally protected speech of adults
who would be required, under the CDA, to limit their online speech to that
which could be safely shared with the children who might gain access to
that speech.73 Consequently, the CDA lacked the precision required by the
First Amendment for a statute that regulates the content of speech.74 In
such cases, the statute must be narrowly tailored to achieve the
government's compelling interest-in this case, the protection of minors
from exposure to harmful materials online-without excessively
burdening the First Amendment rights of adults. 75 The Court, noting that
the government had failed to show that the CDA used the least restrictive
alternative to achieve the government's interests, ruled that the statute
could not be constitutionally applied.76
B. The Child OnlineProtection Act
Undaunted by the spectacular failure of the Communications Decency
Act, Congress attempted to cure the constitutional infirmities that had
killed the CDA in its second statutory attempt to control Internet content
directly-the Child Online Protection Act (COPA).77 In fact, while
Congress tried to make COPA somewhat more refined and narrowly

71. Reno 11, 521 U.S. at 879 (listing chat groups, newsgroups, and mail exploders as examples of
the Intemet's many "modalities").
72. Id. at 855-57. As pointed out in both Reno I and Reno II, there is no effective way to
determine the age of a participant in the various forms of Intemet communication. E-mail addresses
reveal nothing about the age or true identity of the Interet speakers; broadcast mail exploders, such as
listservs, send out communications to all subscribers' computers without regard for the age of the
person who might be using the computer at the time the message is received; and no technology exists
that can alleviate these realities of Intemet architecture. The use of credit cards and adult identification
passwords, while a step in the right direction, are also far from foolproof, both because they can fall
into the hands of minors and because the monetary and personal privacy costs associated with the use
of such systems is likely to deter some adults from participating in speech in which they are
constitutionally entitled to engage.
73. Id. at 871-72.
Given the size of the potential audience for most messages, in the absence of a viable age
verification process, the sender must be charged with knowing that one or more minors will
likely view it. Knowledge that, for instance, one or more members of a 100-person chat group
will be minor-and therefore that it would be a crime to send the group an indecent
message-would surely burden communication among adults.
Id. at 876-77.
74. Id. at 874.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 879.
77. Pub. L. No. 105-277, supra note 27.
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focused than the CDA, the statute has proved to be laden with flaws that
have, thus far, prevented its implementation.
COPA imposes criminal sanctions on individuals or entities who, for
commercial purposes, use the Internet to communicate or offer to
communicate material that could be accessed by minors78 and that contains
content that is "harmful to minors. 7 9 Unlike the CDA, communications by
private parties are not regulated under COPA; instead, the statute targets
only those "engaged in the business of making such communications." 80 In
addition, Congress refined COPA's scope regarding material it was
attempting to prevent minors from viewing, abandoning the CDA's
impossibly vague "indecent" and "patently offensive" categories that had
failed to withstand constitutional scrutiny in Reno I. Instead, COPA uses
what lawmakers hoped would be a more meaningful and constitutionally
defensible category of prohibited online speech-speech that is "harmful
to minors.",8' Finally, COPA enumerates a series of age verification
strategies that, if used by an online publisher, provide an affirmative
a minor does, in fact, gain
defense to liability under the statute even if 82
access to the materials restricted by the statute.
A month before the statute was to take effect at the end of November

78. A "minor" is defined in COPA as "any person under 17 years of age." 47 U.S.C. § 231 (e)(7).
Compare the Communications Decency Act, which defined a minor as "any person under 18 years of
age." 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(B)(ii).
79. 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1).
80. Id. § 231(e)(2)(A).
81. COPA states that online material will be considered "harmful to minors" only if each part of
the following test is satisfied:
(A) the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find, taking the
material as a whole and with respect to minors, is designed to appeal to, or is designed to
pander to, the prurient interest;
(B) depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner patently offensive with respect to minors, an
actual or simulated sexual act or sexual contact, an actual or simulated normal or perverted
sexual act, or a lewd exhibition of the genitals or post-pubescent female breast; and
(C) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors.
Id. § 231 (e)(6). Congress expressed its feeling that such a standard complied with the definition of
"harmful to minors" upheld by the Supreme Court. See H.R. Rep. No. 105-775, at 11-13 (1998) (citing
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 646 (1968), modified by Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973)).
82. Specifically, COPA states that:
It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section that the defendant, in good faith,
has restricted access by minors to material that is harmful to minors(A) by requiring use of credit card, debit account, adult access code, or adult personal
identification number;
(B) by accepting a digital certificate that verifies age; or
(C) by any other reasonable measures that are feasible under available technology.
47 U.S.C. § 231(c)(1).
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1998, the ACLU and others 83 challenged COPA on First and Fifth
Amendment grounds in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania and sought injunctive relief preventing the statute
from taking effect in American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno (Reno I).84
The plaintiffs argued that the statute was facially invalid under the First
Amendment because it both impermissibly burdened protected adult
speech and violated the speech rights of minors. Additionally, the
plaintiffs argued that the statute's definition of material that is "harmful to
minors" was unconstitutionally vague under the First and Fifth
Amendments. 86 The plaintiffs further contended that COPA was not the
least restrictive alternative that the government could use to achieve its
stated purpose of protecting minors from harmful Internet materials.8 7
Finally, the plaintiffs argued that the affirmative defenses listed in COPA
would be too expensive and technologically cumbersome to relieve the
statute's impermissible burden on protected speech. 88
As it had done in the earlier CDA challenge, the district court agreed
that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their First
Amendment claims and issued a temporary restraining order before the
statute was implemented. 89 This order was followed several months later
by the issuance of a preliminary injunction barring the government from
enforcing or prosecuting matters under COPA. 90 The district court's
injunction rested on classic principles of analysis for cases in which
protected speech is jeopardized by government regulation. Under these
principles, nonobscene sexual expression is protected by the First
Amendment, 9 1 and content-based regulations of that expression, such as
83. The ACLU was joined by a variety of online content providers, Web site operators and other
online commercial entities as plaintiffs in this action.
84. ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Pa. 1999) [hereinafter Reno III].
85. Id. at 478-79.
86. Id. at 479.
87. Id. at 492. In particular, plaintiffs suggested that the use of software "blocking" or "filtering"
technology by parents and by Interet service providers would be a far less restrictive means of
achieving the government's goal and at least as effective as the proscriptions on "harmful" speech
mandated in COPA. Interestingly, among its findings of fact, the court described as "undisputed" that
blocking and filtering technology does not work perfectly. Id. Specifically, the court acknowledged
that software filters frequently block sites that are completely appropriate for minors and also fail to
block sites that might be deemed inappropriate for minors. Id. Further, the court recognized that
minors with patience and sufficient computer skills would be able to circumvent software filters and
blocking devices. Id.
88. Id. at 479.
89. ACLU v. Reno, Civ. No. 98-5591, 1998 WL 813423 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 23, 1998).
90. Reno 111,31 F. Supp. 2d at 473.
91. See, e.g., Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
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COPA, are presumptively invalid and subject to strict scrutiny. 92 The

government may regulate protected speech content to fulfill a compelling
state interest, but it is required to choose the least restrictive and most
narrowly tailored means to satisfy the government's interest without
unduly compromising First Amendment freedoms. 93 Although the district
court simply assumed that COPA was based on Congress's compelling
interest in protecting minors from indecent materials, 94 the court found that
it was not apparent that the government could carry its burden of showing
that the statute represented the least restrictive and most narrowly tailored
means of achieving that goal, thereby leading to the issuance of a
preliminary injunction. 95
The government appealed the district court's decision to the Third
96 The court of appeals affirmed,
Circuit Court of Appeals (Reno IV).
but
based its decision entirely on an issue that was not relied on below-that
COPA's use of "contemporary community standards" to identify material
that is "harmful to minors" rendered the statute substantially overbroad. 97
The court of appeals reasoned that because Web publishers have no
technological means of limiting access to their sites based on the
geographic location of particular Internet users, the safest reading of
COPA requires Web publishers either to censor materials to a level
acceptable in the most restrictive community in the nation, or to shield
"any material that might be deemed harmful by the most puritan of
communities in any state

. . ."

behind age or credit card verification

systems.98 Although the latter approach arguably protects Web publishers
and prevents wholesale prophylactic content censorship, individuals over
seventeen without the necessary age verification credentials would be
denied access to protected materials, as would all minors under seventeen
seeking access to materials not "deemed 'harmful' to them in their
respective geographic communities." 99 Because of this resulting limitation

92. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) ("The First Amendment generally
prevents government from proscribing speech ...because of disapproval of the ideas expressed.");
Sable, 492 U.S. at 126.
93. See, e.g., Sable, 492 U.S. at 126.
94. Reno 111, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 495 (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1968)).
95. 31 F. Supp. 2d at 496-97. While recognizing that final determinations on the First
Amendment issues presented would have to await a trial on the merits, the court agreed with the
plaintiffs that the categories of speech covered by COPA were excessively broad. Id.
96. ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. granted sub noa., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 532
U.S. 1037 (2001), and vacatedby 535 U.S. 564, 122 S.Ct. 1700 (2002) [hereinafter Reno IV].

97. Id. at 173-74.
98. Id. at 175.
99. Id.
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on free speech, the court of appeals held that "this aspect of COPA,
without reference to its other provisions, must lead inexorably to a holding
of a likelihood of unconstitutionality of the entire COPA statute." ' 00
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari' 0'-renaming the
case Ashcroft v. ACLU after the change in administrations-to review the
findings of the court of appeals and subsequently vacated the Third
Circuit's judgment. 0 2 The Supreme Court held that the use of "community
standards" to identify "material that is harmful to minors" under COPA
does not by itself render the statute facially unconstitutional. 0 3 Beyond
this core point, however, the Justices of the Supreme Court displayed deep
philosophical divisions regarding exactly what "community standards"
should mean in the context of the Internet, as demonstrated by the five
opinions written to address this issue. 0 4 Arguably, most philosophically
troubling for future First Amendment protection of Internet content is the
opinion written by Justice Thomas and joined by Justices Rehnquist and
Scalia. In it, Justice Thomas endorsed the constitutionality of COPA's
requirement subjecting Internet content to local community standards as a
10 5
means of determining what Internet content is harmful to minors.
Seemingly ignoring the Reno II rejection of a Miller-like community
standard criterion as applied to Internet content,' 0 6 Justice Thomas opined
that "any variance caused by the statute's reliance on community standards
100. Id. at 174. The court itself raised the issue of the inappropriateness of COPA's reliance on
"contemporary community standards" as the test of online content during oral argument. The court
based its opinion on the apparent unconstitutionality of that clause alone, and did very little to address
the numerous other constitutional issues raised by the district court. Id. at 173-74.
101. ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. granted sub nom., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 532
U.S. 1037 (2001), and vacated by 535 U.S. 564, 122 S.Ct. 1700 (2002).
102. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 122 S.Ct. 1700 (2002).
103. Id. at 1713. The Court stressed that the scope of its decision was "quite limited," and clearly
did not intend this holding to go beyond the facts and procedural posture of the current litigation
testing the constitutionality of COPA. Id. Although the Court rejected the argument that COPA's use
of community standards to identify material that is harmful to minors, by itself, rendered the statute
unconstitutional on its face, neither did a majority of the Court endorse any particular definition of
community standards that it would hold, conclusively, to pass constitutional muster when used to
judge whether or not Intemet transmissions are, in fact, harmful to minors. "The fact that distributors
of allegedly obscene materials may be subjected to varying community standards in the various federal
judicial districts into which they transmit the materials does not render a federal statute
unconstitutional." Id. at 1711 (quoting Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 106 (1974)) (internal
quotations omitted).
104. See infra notes 107-15 and accompanying text.
105. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 122 S. Ct. at 1703-14.
106. See Reno 11, 521 U.S. at 877-78 (rejecting the "community standards criterion" as applied to
the Internet because "any communication available to a nationwide audience will be judged by the
standards of the community most likely to be offended by the message").
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is not substantial enough to violate the First Amendment."' 0 7 Believing
that there is no constitutional barrier to prohibiting communications that
are obscene according to some communities' standards even though they
would not be obscene according to the standards in others, Justice Thomas
to comply
concluded that the ultimate burden is on the Internet publisher
108
with all possible local prohibitions on obscene messages:
If a publisher chooses to send its material into a particular
community, this Court's jurisprudence teaches that it is the
publisher's responsibility to abide by that community's standards.
The publisher's burden does not change simply because it decides
to distribute its material to every community in the Nation .... If a
publisher wishes for its material to be judged only by the standards
of particular communities, then it need only take the simple step of
utilizing a medium that enables it to target the release of its material
into those communities. 109
In separate opinions, Justices O'Connor l ° and Breyer 11 called for the
development of national community standards for evaluating the
constitutional status of sexual material on the Internet. Justice Kennedy
107. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 122 S. Ct. at 1713. See generally Dennis W. Chiu, Comment, Obscenity
on the Internet: Local Community Standards for Obscenity are Unworkable on the Information
Superhighway, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 185 (1995); William D. Deane, Comment, COPA and
Community Standards on the Internet: Should the People of Maine and Mississippi Dictate the
Obscenity Standards in Las Vegas and New York? 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 245 (2001); Erik G. Swenson,
Comment, Redefining Community Standards in Light of the Geographic Limitlessness of the Internet:
A Critique of United States v. Thomas, 82 MINN. L. REV. 855 (1998).
108. Ashcroft, 122 S. Ct. at 1711 (citing Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S.
115, 125-26 (1989)).
109. Id. at 1712. Justice Thomas argued that this approach is virtually identical with Court
precedent in Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974), and Sable Communications of California,
Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989). In Hamling, a case challenging a statute prohibiting the mailing of
obscene material, the Court held that "[t]he fact that distributors of allegedly obscene materials may be
subjected to varying community standards in the various federal judicial districts into which they
transmit the materials does not render a federal statute unconstitutional .... " Hamling, 418 U.S. at
106. In Sable, a case in which a statutory provision prohibited commercial "dial-a-porn" operators
from using telephones to engage in obscene or indecent communications, the Court stated that "if [a
dial-a-pom business's] audience is comprised of different communities with different local standards,
[the business] ultimately bears the burden of complying with the [local] prohibition on obscene
messages." Sable, 492 U.S. at 106. In his dissent in Ashcroft v. ACLU, Justice Stevens strongly
criticized Justice Thomas' reliance on Hamling and Sable, arguing that characteristics of mail and
telephone communications allow distributors using those media to prevent transmissions into
communities where content is likely to be viewed as obscene or indecent. Stevens pointed out that
there is currently no way to effect this same type of geographic control for the transmission of Internet
content. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 122 S. Ct. at 1722-28.
110. Id. at 1714-15 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, and concurring in the judgment).
111. Id. at 1715-16 (Breyer, J., concurring in part, and concurring in the judgment).
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(joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg) cited the Reno III court's
concerns that COPA was overbroad, and that the question of community
standards could not be evaluated without the court of appeals analyzing
that issue on remand. 1 2 Finally, Justice Stevens, in dissent, would have
affirmed the Reno IV court's opinion that the use of local community
standards to evaluate Internet content renders COPA unconstitutional on
its face.'' 3
Although Ashcroft v. ACLU provides a fascinating glimpse of the
thinking of individual Supreme Court justices concerning the
constitutional status of Internet speech, the opinion certainly does not
provide a final determination concerning the constitutionality of COPA.
The Court simply vacated and remanded the case to the court of appeals
because it did not agree that the statute's use of community standards as a
means of identifying material that is "harmful to minors" is, by itself,
fatal.' 4 Leaving in place the lower court's injunction against enforcement
of the statute, the Court reserved judgment on "whether COPA suffers
from substantial overbreadth for other reasons, whether the statute is
unconstitutionally vague, or whether the District Court correctly
concluded that the statute likely will not survive strict scrutiny analysis
once adjudication of the case is completed below.""' 5 Once fact-finding
has been completed and the court of appeals has ruled on the case on its
merits, it is very likely that the Supreme Court will again be given the
chance to decide the ultimate fate of COPA.
C. FirstAmendment PrinciplesEmergingfrom the CDA and COPA
Challenges
The litigation surrounding the CDA and COPA challenges proved to be
the battleground where First Amendment principles were first applied to
the realm of online speech. Emerging from these decisions are a number of
legal rulings and factual determinations that form the jurisprudential
standards against which statutes similar to the CDA and COPA will be
analyzed. Perhaps as importantly, these principles served as a reality check
to Congress's would-be Internet censors, providing notice that the courts
and the Constitution would not allow Congress to run roughshod over
Internet speech.

112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

1716-22 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
1722-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1713-14.
1713.
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1. Standardof Review
Both the CDA and COPA were adjudged to be government-imposed,
content-based restrictions on speech that was characterized by Congress,
almost interchangeably, as "indecent," "patently offensive," or "harmful to
minors."' 1 6 In analyzing the constitutionality of both statutes' regulatory
schemes, the courts called upon a number of core First Amendment
principles as the foundation for their decisions." 7
Even when it may be distasteful and offensive to some, speech that is
neither obscene nor child pornography is constitutionally protected for
adults. 18 Because of this protection, governmental content-based
regulations of protected speech are presumed to violate the First
Amendment 1 9 and are upheld only when found to promote a compelling
state interest. 20 Even then, most of these regulations will be strictly
scrutinized under the First Amendment,' 2' not only to determine whether
the stated interest is sufficiently "compelling" in the constitutional sense,
but also to assure that the government chooses the least restrictive and
most narrowly tailored means of achieving its regulatory interests without
unnecessarily burdening First Amendment rights.122 In evaluating
government regulations of protected expression, the courts require that the
benefits gained by enforcement of the challenged statute outweigh the
burden imposed
on speech for the regulation to stand a chance of being
23
validated. 1
In limited situations, the courts have endorsed less than strict scrutiny
review of government regulations of indecent speech. Most noteworthy is
the area of broadcasting where, in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,124 the
Supreme Court endorsed extremely broad Federal Communications
Commission administrative sanctions against a radio broadcaster for airing
George Carlin's now infamous "Filthy Words" monologue 25 at a time

116. Reno 111, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 492-93; Reno 1, 929 F. Supp. at 857.
117. Reno 11I, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 492-93; Reno 1, 929 F. Supp. at 857.

118. Sable, 492 U.S. at 126 (holding that adults' access to indecent speech is protected by the First
Amendment). See also Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 747-48.
119. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992); Sable, 492 U.S. at 126.
120. Sable, 492 U.S. at 126.
121. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994), vacated by, 512 U.S.
1230 (1994) ("Our precedents thus apply the most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress,
disadvantage, or impose differential burdens upon speech because of its content.") (citing Perry Educ.
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
122. Sable, 492 U.S. at 126.
123. Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 363 (1976).
124. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
125. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 751-755 (appendix containing transcript of monologue).
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likely to be heard by children. 126 In Reno I and Reno II, the government
argued that Congress's interest in shielding minors from exposure to
indecent Internet content was at least as compelling as the FCC's control
of broadcast content and that the CDA should be reviewed under the same
reduced level of constitutional scrutiny as that endorsed for broadcast
regulations in Pacifica.127 The courts, however, rejected the comparison,
holding that the unique characteristics of broadcasting that allow
government regulation to survive a reduced level of First Amendment
scrutiny do not exist for the Internet. 28 Whereas the availability of, and
access to, broadcast signals is a scarce, expensive commodity in need of
government regulation to assure that it is used in the public interest, 129 the
Internet has been described as a "vast democratic forum[]" used by over
one hundred million people in the United States alone to access content
"as diverse as human thought."'' 30 In addition, while broadcast media have
been described as "uniquely pervasive" in their ability to enter homes and
deliver unwelcome content without warning,' 3' Internet communications
require affirmative steps to be taken before information is delivered to
one's computer. 132 Finally, the courts recognize that there is a history of
extensive government regulation of broadcasting that they can rely on
when scrutinizing regulations of related media. 133 By contrast, the
Internet's phenomenal public growth has occurred devoid of government
regulation.134
Having rejected the comparison to broadcast media, the Supreme Court
has concluded that the proper level of First Amendment review for

126. Id. at 750-51. The Court emphasized the narrowness of its ruling, stopping far short of
granting a categorical government prohibition of offensive speech. Rather, the Court endorsed the
F.C.C.'s authority to regulate broadcasts of speech that, though not inherently offensive if aired at
times unlikely to be heard by children, is unsuitable for broadcast when children are likely to hear
them. Id. at 750.
127. See Reno 11, 521 U.S. at 866-67; Reno 1,929 F. Supp. at 850.
128. Reno 11,
521 U.S. at 866-67 ("[Tihe Court concluded that the ease with which children may
obtain access to broadcasts ... justified special treatment of indecent broadcasting."); Reno 1,929 F.
Supp. at 862 ("[T]hc Court [in Pacifica] emphasized that its narrow holding applied only to
broadcasting which is 'uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to read."').
129. Reno 11,521 U.S. at 868 (citing Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637-38
(1994)).
130. Reno 11, 521 U.S. at 868-70 (quoting Reno 1, 929 F. Supp. at 842).
131. Pacifica,438 U.S. at 748-49.
132. Reno 11, 521 U.S. at 869 ("[C]ommunications over the Internet do not 'invade' an
individual's home or appear on one's computer screen unbidden. Users seldom encounter content 'by
accident."') (quoting Reno 1,929 F. Supp. at 844).
133. Reno 11,521 U.S. at 868 (citing Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 399-400).
134. Id.
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government regulation of Internet content is strict scrutiny. 135 The
threshold question in any strict scrutiny analysis must be whether the
government can demonstrate that it does, in fact, have a constitutionally
compelling state interest in regulating speech. 136 Absent a constitutionally
sufficient compelling state interest, the remaining elements of strict
scrutiny analysis need not be examined. 37 In theory, this demonstration
requires more than an unsupported claim by the government designed to
elicit visceral public reaction and stir public support. First Amendment
jurisprudence requires the government to meet exacting standards when it
moves to regulate protected speech. As the strict scrutiny standard has
developed in First Amendment cases, "compelling" does not mean simply
that the government's interest is legitimate or important; rather, the
government must demonstrate that its interest in regulating speech aims at
avoiding harms that are "real, not merely conjectural, and that the
regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material
way."138
Application of these principles means that the mere existence of
indecent material on the Internet and government concern over its possible
effects on children should not be ruled sufficient to satisfy the test for
compelling state interest; the government should be required to prove
actual harm to children from exposure to indecent materials online and
that its proposed regulation of certain online speech can, in fact, alleviate
that harm. However, touching the hot button of "child protection" has long

135. In rejecting the reduced level of First Amendment scrutiny afforded to regulation of
broadcast content, the Court chose to allow this new medium to develop unburdened by heavy-handed
federal regulation. See Reno 11,521 U.S. at 870 ("We agree with [the district court's] conclusion that
our cases provide no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied
to this medium."). Commentators have recognized the importance of the Court's determination that
regulations of Intemet speech would be subjected to the highest level of constitutional scrutiny. See,
e.g., Jesse H. Choper, Uri and Caroline Bauer Memorial Lecture: On the Difference in Importance
Between Supreme Court Doctrine and Actual Consequences: A Review of the Supreme Court's 199697 Term, 19 CARDoZO L. REV. 2259 (1998).
In analyzing (Reno I1], the doctrinal significance of according speech on the Interet the
strongest degree of First Amendment protection should not be minimized. Underscoring the
Intemet's importance for free expression by referring to its "vast democratic fora," and
observing that the medium allows its users to "become a town crier with a voice that
resonates farther than it could from any soapbox," the Court declined the Government's
invitation to allow the kind of regulatory leeway that had been granted to Congress over the
broadcast media.
Id. at 2283.
136. Ross, supra note 7, at 460 ("The state must both articulate and demonstrate a compelling
interest based on a real harm in order to justify any government regulation on the content of speech.").
137. Id. ("According to First Amendment doctrine, courts may not even evaluate whether a given
regulation is narrowly tailored until the state establishes its compelling interest.").
138. Tumer Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994).
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been used to win political support for censorship of various media,1 39 and
the courts have demonstrated a willingness to allow the government a
"free pass" by presuming that any governmental regulation promulgated in
140
the name of protecting children is constitutionally compelling.
Even if Congress's interest in protecting children is found by the courts
to be sufficiently compelling to pass the initial hurdle of First Amendment
analysis, the government carries an extremely heavy burden of proving
that the method chosen to restrict speech is the least restrictive means
available to satisfy the governmental interest and, further, that the
restriction is narrowly tailored to avoid unduly compromising the
fundamental right of free speech.14 1 In Reno II, the Court concluded that
the extraordinary breadth of online communications made even serious
adult online speech about sexual matters subject to criminal prosecution
under the CDA if it were intercepted by a minor. 142 The Court recognized
that, by forcing adults to modify otherwise protected speech in order to
make it acceptable for minors who might be listening, the CDA was not
43
narrowly tailored to avoid a chilling effect on protected adult speech.
COPA fared no better on this point in Reno J11, where the district court
stated that it was unlikely that the government could meet its burden to
139. Ross, supra note 7, at 467 ("[T]he implicit promise of judicial deference invites legislators
and advocates of censorship to abridge speech with relative abandon.").
140. Reno 11, 521 U.S. at 875 ("It is true that we have repeatedly recognized the governmental
interest in protecting children from harmful materials.") (citing Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639; Pacifica,
438 U.S. at 749)). This governmental interest has been extended to include "shielding [minors] from
materials that are not obscene by adult standards." Reno 111, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 495 (citing Sable, 492
U.S. at 126; Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639-40). See also Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp.
2d 401, 471 (stating that "[t]he government's interest in preventing the dissemination of obscenity,
child pornography, or, in the case of minors, material harmful to minors, is well-established."). But see
Reno 1, 929 F. Supp. at 853, where Chief Circuit Judge Sloviter provided a rare example of judicial
skepticism about whether the government had done enough to show that its interest in regulating the
"vast range of online material covered or potentially covered by the CDA" was compelling.
Ultimately, and without elaboration, Judge Sloviter agreed that "there is certainly a compelling
government interest to shield a substantial number of minors from some of the online material that
motivated Congress to enact the CDA." Id. But cf Ross, supra note 7, at 429 ("Confronted with the
incantation that the state aims to safeguard children, courts at every level, including the Supreme
Court, have regularly failed to scrutinize the interest alleged by the government.").
141. Renol1, 521 U.S. at 879.
142. Id. at 871. Absent a clear definition of the terms "indecent" and "patently offensive" in the
CDA, the Court wondered if a speaker could "confidently assume that a serious discussion about birth
control practices, homosexuality, the First Amendment issues raised by the Appendix to our Pacifica
opinion, or the consequences of prison rape would not violate the CDA." Id. The Court concluded that
"[t]his uncertainty undermines the likelihood that the CDA has been carefully tailored to the
congressional goal of protecting minors from potentially harmful materials." Id.
143. Reno II, 521 U.S. at 874-75 ("'[R]egardless of the strength of the government's interest' in
protecting children, '[t]he level of discourse ... cannot be limited to that which would be suitable for a
sandbox."') (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74-75 (1983)).
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show that the statute used the least restrictive and most narrowly tailored
means to protect minors from gaining online access to commercial
pornography. 144 Specifically, the court observed that there is no effective
way to ensure that commercial pornography will not show up on foreign
Websites, on noncommercial Websites, or through other direct peer-topeer exchanges, none of which were within the scope of COPA
coverage. 145 In a manner similar to the CDA, leaving commercial and
noncommercial Website operators vulnerable to criminal prosecution for
distribution of protected adult speech that, through no fault of their own, is
distributed somewhere on the Internet and accessed by a minor has a
chilling effect on that protected speech. 146
In stripping the government of its claim to the high moral ground and
forcing it to justify its actions under the harsh lamp of strict scrutiny, the
Reno decisions revealed both the CDA and COPA to be ill-disguised
attempts to censor Internet content broadly-not just protecting children
from accessing constitutionally unprotected material, but making an entire
category of offensive, although fully protected, speech inaccessible for
everyone, adults and children, alike.
2. Inability and Impracticalityof Using Current Technology to
Regulate Online Speech within ConstitutionalBounds
A hallmark of the government's defense of its statutory attempts to
regulate online speech is the apparent underlying assumption that effective
technological solutions exist that can limit children's exposure to harmful
material on the Internet without compromising adults' First Amendment
rights. The government's arguments in defense of the CDA and COPA
included claims that online age verification, adult identification
techniques, and content ratings could be used to shield transmitters of
indecent material from liability under the statutes. 147 However, the courts
have shown an unexpected level of appreciation for the limitations of these
technologies, and these limitations have been consistently noted in the

144. Reno ll, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 497.
145. Id. at 496 ("[T]his Court's finding that minors may be able to gain access to harmful to
minors materials on foreign Web sites, non-commercial sites, and online via protocols other than http
demonstrates the problems this statute has with efficaciously meeting its goal.").
146. Id.
147. Reno 111, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 487 (listing the affirmative defenses available under COPA);
Reno II, 521 U.S. at 860 ("[Tlhe CDA provided two affirmative defenses to prosecution: (1) the use of
a credit card or other age verification system, and (2) any good faith effort to restrict access by
minors.").
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developing body of First Amendment law dealing with online speech. 148
The courts are aware that age verification using credit cards and adult
identification numbers is not only technically possible, but is, in fact,
actually used by providers of adult content on. the Internet.149 The courts
also realize, however, that maintenance of an age verification process is
not without costs 150 and that, for noncommercial online speakers, these
processes may be "economically and practically unavailable.'"',
Even where Congress attempted to ameliorate this problem in COPA
by limiting the scope of online speech regulation to commercial speakers,
the courts recognized the dilemma that such speakers face if they are
required to use technologies that all agree cannot possibly verify the
identity, age, or physical location of everyone who might possibly gain
access to their sites.1 52 Commercial speakers faced with high costs of age
verification systems are likely to avoid the problem by refusing to publish
controversial speech.153 Further, with no way to be sure that minors will

148. See, e.g., Reno 111, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 487-92 (presenting extensive findings of fact concerning
technological flaws in the use of credit cards, adult-access numbers, and filtering software that limit
their effectiveness to verify age of Internet users); Reno II, 521 U.S. at 882 (agreeing with the Reno I
court that the "Government failed to adduce any evidence that these verification techniques [online use
of credit cards and adult identification numbers] actually preclude minors from posing as adults");
Reno I, 929 F. Supp. at 846-48 (findings of fact detailing the technological impracticalities of three
potential affirmative defenses under the CDA: credit card verification, use of adult identification
numbers or passwords to verify age, and tagging of online content to label it as containing indecent or
patently offensive speech).
149. Reno 111, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 488; Reno 11, 521 U.S. at 856, 876.
150. Reno 111, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 488. Testimony received during the Pennsylvania District Court's
examination of the motion to enjoin enforcement of COPA details the technical complexity and
significant expense involved in using credit card verification on the Internet. The court heard
testimony that initial start-up costs of approximately $300 to "thousands of dollars" to set up one's
own secure server are typical, and that per transaction fees are borne by the online content provider
thereafter. Id. Online content providers have the option of contracting with a third party to manage
their online credit card verification processes, but, although unspecified in the accompanying
testimony, the courts recognize that these services are not inexpensive to use. Id.
151. Reno I, 929 F. Supp. at 846.
152. Reno 111, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 495; Reno 11, 521 U.S. at 855, 876, 881-82. By its very nature, the
Internet makes it virtually impossible to determine the age and physical location of those engaged in
online communications. This difficulty is particularly present in the case of the most public of Internet
forums--chat rooms, newsgroups, mail exploders, and the Web-which are openly accessible to all
comers. See Reno 1, 929 F. Supp. at 845.
In assessing the burden placed on protected speech by COPA, it is necessary to take into
consideration the unique factors that affect communication in the new and technology-laden
medium of the Web ... [T]he plaintiffs have presented evidence that the nature of the Web
and the Internet is such that Web site operators and content providers cannot know who is
accessing their sites, or from where, or how old the users are, unless they take affirmative
steps to gather information from the user and the user is willing to given [sic] them truthful
responses.
Reno III, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 495.
153. See, e.g., id.; Reno I1, 521 U.S. at 877.
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not slip through the age verification safety net, online publishers and
speakers are likely to aggressively self-censor materials that would result
in criminal charges if accessed by minors, but that are fully protected adult
speech. 154 Finally, commercial online publishers are unlikely to provide
access to protected adult speech if their potential customers refuse to use
their sites because they dislike having to endure cumbersome identity
verification procedures. 55
Although both the CDA and COPA suggest that parties making "good
faith" efforts to apply technologies designed to keep minors from
accessing indecent speech would be shielded from prosecution under those
statutes, Congress was very careful not to specify what technology
applications would be "good enough" to qualify as an affirmative defense
under either Act.' 56 Tagging or rating of Internet content was mentioned
by the government in Reno I and Reno II as an example of what Congress
must have meant when it added a catch-all "good faith" affirmative
defense to prosecution under the CDA. 57 Specifically, the government
suggested that Web content providers who embedded coded descriptions
(so-called metatags) in Web pages containing indecent or patently
offensive materials would have such a defense because end-users could
install software filters on their computers set to screen out content
containing those tags.' 58 Although the Reno I and Reno II courts rejected
the government's argument that a content-tagging defense saved the CDA
from its First Amendment fate because the technology described did not
fully exist at that time, both courts presciently predicted the constitutional
infirmities that content rating systems would exhibit once developed in the

154. Reno Ill, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 494-95.
155. Id. at 495.
156. 47 U.S.C. § 223(e)(5)(A) states in pertinent part that:
(5) It is a defense to a prosecution [under the "indecency" and "patently offensive" provisions
of the CDA]... that a person(A) has taken, in good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions under the
circumstances to restrict or prevent access by minors to a communication specified ... which
may involve any appropriate measures to restrict minors from such communications,
including any method which is feasible under available technology ....
47 U.S.C. § 223(e).
157. Reno I1, 521 U.S. at 881 ("[R]elying on the 'good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate
actions' provision, the Government suggests that 'tagging' provides a defense that saves the
constitutionality of the CDA."); Reno I, 929 F. Supp. at 878 n.20 (incorporating into its opinion a letter
from the Department of Justice that expressed the position that "tagging by content providers coupled
with evidence that the tag would be screened by the marketplace of browsers and blocking software"
would satisfy the CDA's good faith defense).
158. Renol, 929 F. Supp. at 856.
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years following the CDA litigation.1 59 For content tagging to be truly
effective at shielding Internet publishers from liability, ratings would have
to be uniformly and accurately applied by content providers. Even then, as
the Supreme Court pointed out, there would be no way for Internet
publishers to be sure that all potential recipients were using screening
software that would recognize the metatags and block indecent or patently
offensive materials if they chose not to receive them. 160 Without this
"impossible knowledge," the Court recognized that a transmitter of CDAproscribed materials could not be sure that content rating would be
"effective" and would thereby be left vulnerable to prosecution under the
statute.' 61
D. Direct CongressionalRegulation of Online Content Thwarted
As First Amendment cases go, neither the CDA nor COPA presented
the greatest constitutional challenges. Both statutes were drafted without
the slightest sensitivity for classic First Amendment pitfalls and were
essentially dead on arrival at the courthouse. 162 At least one commentator
believes that a more carefully drafted statute than either the CDA or
COPA could directly regulate Internet content and survive constitutional
scrutiny, 163 but the resounding defeat of the CDA in Reno I and Reno II
and the seemingly perpetual injunction against enforcement being endured
by COPA certainly cast this opinion into doubt.
Clearly, advocates of online censorship needed to find a more
sophisticated First Amendment approach to achieve significant regulation
of Internet content. They believe that they have found it in Congress's
power of the purse.

159. Reno II, 521 U.S. at 881 (recognizing the lack of any guarantees that online speakers will
actually "tag" their materials and the absence of screening software that can interact with content tags
to ensure that minors cannot receive transmission deemed harmful to them. Because the CDA requires
that good faith actions be "effective," the Court describes tagging as an "illusory" defense under the
Act. Id.). Reno 1, 929 F. Supp. at 878 (expressing doubt that tagging is a defense under the CDA).
160. Reno 11, 521 U.S. at 881.
161. Id. In theory, the problems of voluntary Web content ratings could be resolved through the
application of a government-mandated standard rating system and distribution of compatible screening
software. Such a mandate is rife with constitutional problems and, as Professor Lawrence Lessig has
observed, would likely lead to far more speech being filtered than is within the legitimate interest of
the government. Lawrence Lessig, What Things Regulate Speech: CDA 2.0 vs. Filtering, 38
JURIMETRICS J. 629, 665 (1998).
162. COPA retains a pulse, albeit weak, at the time of this writing. Enforcement of COPA having
been enjoined from the outset, it has endured three judicial hearings, none of which has reached the
merits of the case. See discussion supra Part lI.B.
163. See Lessig, supra note 161.
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III. CONGRESS'S REGULATION OF SPEECH INDIRECTLY THROUGH ITS
SPENDING POWER: THE CHILDREN'S INTERNET PROTECTION ACT

A. Congress'sEnactment of the Children'sInternet ProtectionAct

Stung by the debacle of the CDA and COPA challenges, and
recognizing just how difficult it would be to directly control Internet
content, those members of Congress bent on bringing governmental
control to online speech devised what they believe is an ingenious and
constitutionally invulnerable strategy to accomplish this goal through
indirect means. That strategy, based on contingent offers of federal funds
rather than statutory proscription to accomplish regulation of Internet
content, is embodied in the Children's Internet Protection Act' 64 (CIPA).
Like the failed statutory attempts to regulate Internet content before it,
CIPA's ultimate goal is the regulation of online speech that Congress finds
objectionable, particularly when viewed by minors. However, Congress
hopes that the critical difference that will make CIPA immune from
constitutional attack lies in the mechanism used to effect Internet
regulation. CIPA, unlike the CDA and COPA, does not directly proscribe

general categories of Internet content. 65 Instead, CIPA seeks to regulate
online speech indirectly by pressuring, rather than mandating, schools and
public libraries to adopt software filters and other specific steps to reduce
minors' access to illegal and harmful materials on their Intemet-accessible
computers.166 The law applies that pressure to adopt filtering, not directly
through threat of criminal or civil penalties, but indirectly by declaring
that any school or library that refuses to apply filters is ineligible to
164. Children's Internet Protection Act, 47 U.S.C.A. § 254(h) (Supp. 2001); 20 U.S.C.A. § 9134
(Supp. 2001).
165. E-Rate and Filtering:A Review of the Children s Internet Protection Act: Hearingbefore the
House Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet of the Committee on Energy and
Commerce, 107th Cong. 8 (2001) (statement of Rep. W. J. "Billy" Tauzin, Chairman) ("[CIPA] is
designed as a condition on receiving federal funds. This is unlike past attempts by Congress to address
the availability of such material, which enacted straight bans or imposed access requirements.").
166. For its proponents, the supposed constitutional cleverness of CIPA's approach to filtering is
that it does not actually mandate the application of this technology at every school and library; rather,
it makes federal universal service funding contingent upon a school or library's certification that they
are filtering their Internet accessible computers. See, e.g., Rep. Charles W. Pickering, TalkBack Live:
Filtering the Internet for Children: Censorship or Protection (CNN television broadcast, Oct. 20,
2000) (transcript available at http:www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0010/20/tl.00.html)
[W]e need to remember this is not a mandate: It is only saying that if [schools and libraries]
accept federal funds, [they] should use these technologies as a tool to protect our children. If
they decide not to use these funds, then they do not have to-to use the filter technologies or
block it out.
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receive critically needed federal technology funding despite being eligible
for these funds in all other respects.' 67 Rather than being compelled by
statute to filter, these institutions are given the choice, albeit a Hobson's
choice, of installing filters or continuing to provide unfiltered access to the
Internet, realizing all too well that, under CIPA, they will lose their
eligibility for federal technology
funds if they choose not to comply with
168
the statute's filtering mandate.
Hardly an instant success, the legislation languished for two years in
Congress due to its sponsors' inability to gain consensus support in both
chambers. t 69 Despite failing to win passage on its own merits, CIPA was
finally enacted into law when its supporters were able to include it as an
eleventh-hour rider to the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001.170
Although President Clinton expressed public misgivings at the wisdom
(and constitutionality) of this law, he was left with little alternative but to
accept CIPA in order
to avoid a politically damaging year-end battle over
17
budget.'
federal
the

167. See Lowell A. Reid, Jr., Symposium: Napster & Beyond: ProtectingCopyright in the Digital
Millennium: Tending the Virtual Village Green: The Internet, the First Amendment, and the Federal
Judge, 20 TEMP. ENVT'L. L. & TECH. J. 1, 5 (2001) (noting that, unlike the CDA and COPA, CIPA
"has no criminal sanctions or civil fines; instead it imposes the sanction of withholding federal funding
from violators.").
168. "CIPA requires libraries that participate in the LSTA and E-rate programs to certify that they
are using software filters on their computers to protect against visual depictions that are obscene, child
pornography, or in the case of minors, harmful to minors." Am. Library Ass'n, Inc. v. United States,
201 F. Supp. 2d at 412.
169. Senator John McCain, CIPA's first and biggest congressional booster, introduced versions of
this legislation, beginning with S. 1619, 105th Cong. (1998) and S. 97, 106th Cong. (1999). Although
both bills received strong Senate support, neither gained support of both chambers, and the entire
effort garnered its share of critical press coverage. See, e.g., Christopher Hunter, Don't Let McCain
Censor the Net, SALON.COM, Oct. 25, 2000, at http://dir.salon.com/tech/log/2000/10/25/filter
_legislation/index.html (taking the view that CIPA's requirement that public libraries filter Internet
content is unnecessary and unconstitutional); Rico Gagliano, Public E-Enemy No. 1?, LA WEEKLY,
Feb. 25, 2000, at 12.
170. Pub. L. No. 106-554, §§ 1701-41, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000).
171. At the December 22, 2000, signing of the budget bill containing CIPA, President Clinton
stated that he was "very disappointed" that Congress had chosen to invoke a filtering mandate, stating
that he preferred to leave it up to localities to develop policies to govern acceptable use of the Internet
that meet their own diverse needs in schools and libraries. Further, he expressed skepticism that
software filters could effectively, and constitutionally, be applied: "[B]ecause current technology may
not be able to differentiate between harmful and non-harmful expression with precision, [CIPA's]
provisions may have the effect of limiting access to valuable information in a manner that offends our
tradition of freedom of speech." See Gordon Flagg, CongressMandates Internet Filters; Resistance on
Court Expected on Freedom of Speech Issues, AM. LIBRARIES, Feb. 1, 2001, at 14.
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B. CIPA Specifics
In making schools and public libraries its battleground for a fight
against smut on the Internet, Congress placed significant limitations on a
number of meritorious federal programs it had created less than a decade
earlier-programs specifically implemented to help these same institutions
gain access to the Internet.' 72 All of the major technology funding
programs directly affected by CIPA were established to ensure widespread
exposure to the educational benefits of the Internet, and one was created
specifically to address the disparity of Internet access between wealthy and
poor school districts.
Specifically, CIPA amends three federal statutes that provide funding
sources upon which many schools and libraries depend to meet various
costs associated with gaining access to the Internet. Simply put, CIPA
applies to any school or library that receives "universal service" (better
known as "E-rate") discounts for Internet access, Internet service, and
internal network wiring and connections, 173 or that receives funds under
either the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) 174 or the
Library Services and Technology Act (LSTA) 175 to pay for Internet access
or to purchase computers. Under CIPA, schools and libraries are ineligible
to receive funds from any of these programs unless they certify that on
every computer capable of accessing the Internet they have adopted, and
are enforcing, a "technology protection measure" designed to prevent
those computers from being used76 to access visual depictions that are
obscene or are child pornography.

172. CIPA's supporters claim that the connection between federal programs supporting school and
library Intemet access and the government's desire to keep harmful online materials out of the hands
of minors is natural and justifiable. As public policy, however, cynics argue that CIPA is a thinly
veiled attempt to compromise the results of a hard-fought and controversial congressional battle that
had led to the commitment of public funds in 1996 to encourage universal access to the Internet. Never
the darling of CIPA's conservative sponsors, the E-rate program is caught in Congress's crosshairs and
is being smothered under a bureaucratic blanket completely unanticipated by Congress when it enacted
the E-rate program and the other funding programs in question. See, e.g., THE E-RATE INAMERICA: A
TALE OF FOUR CITIES 7-15 (Benton Foundation, Andy Carvin ed., 2000).
173. See CIPA § 1721(a) & (b) (both amending the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C.
§ 254(h)).
174. Title III of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, see CIPA § 1711
(amending Title 20 to add § 3601).
175. See CIPA § 1712 (amending the Museum and Library Services Act, 20 U.S.C. § 9134).
176. 47 U.S.C. §§ 254(h)(5)(C), 6(C) (establishing E-rate recipient certification requirements with
respect to any adult users' access to obscenity and child pornography); 20 U.S.C. § 6777(a)(2)(A)
(enumerating ESEA recipient certification requirements with respect to any users' access to obscenity
and child pornography); 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(l)(B) (listing LSTA recipient certification requirements
with respect to any users' access to obscenity and child pornography). Under § 254(h)(7)(E), the term
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Not satisfied targeting just those categories of speech that have no
177
constitutional protection and are clearly illegal for use by anyone,
Congress stretched CIPA's reach into far more tenuous First Amendment
grounds, requiring schools and libraries to certify that any technology
protection measure installed also be capable of blocking or filtering
materials that are "harmful to minors"' 178 when computers are being used
by individuals under the age of seventeen.1 79 In addition, those schools and
libraries seeking E-rate funds face the additional requirement of adopting
what CIPA calls an "Internet safety policy.' 180 By the terms of the Act,
this policy must address a number of specific concerns related to minors'
'81
use of the Internet, including online access to "inappropriate matter;'
the safety and security of minors online; unauthorized access, hacking, and
other unlawful activities by minors; unauthorized disclosure, use and
dissemination of minors' personal identifying information; and the
"obscenity" is defined as having the meaning given such term in 18 U.S.C. § 1460; under
§ 254(h)(7)(F), the term "child pornography" is defined as having the meaning given such term in 18
U.S.C. § 2256.
177. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485, rehg denied, 355 U.S. 852 (1957)
(holding that "obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech").
178. "Harmful to minors" is defined identically in all three statutes as follows:
The term "harmful to minors" means any picture, image, graphic image file, or visual
depiction that(i) taken as a whole and with respect to minors, appeal to a prurient interest in nudity, sex, or
excretion;
(ii) depicts, describes, or represents, in a patently offensive way with respect to what is
suitable for minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or sexual contact, actual or simulated
normal or perverted sexual acts, or a lewd exhibition of the genitals; and
(iii) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value as to minors.
47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(7)(G); 20 U.S.C. § 6777(e)(6); 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(7)(B). Essentially, this reduced
standard of obscenity is patterned after the "obscene for minors" standards endorsed by the Court in
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), and Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205
(1975).
179. See 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(5)(B), 6(B) (listing E-rate recipient certification requirements with
respect to Internet access by minors); 20 U.S.C. § 6777(a)(1)(A) (enumerating ESEA recipient
certification requirements with respect to Internet access by minors); 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(1)(A)
(establishing LSTA recipient certification requirements with respect to Internet access by minors). A
"minor," as defined by CIPA, is "any individual who has not attained the age of 17 years." 47 U.S.C.
§ 254(h)(7)(D).
180. 47 U.S.C. § 254(). See also Am. Library Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401,
422 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (finding that "[a]pproximately 95% of libraries with public Internet access have
some form of 'acceptable use' policy or 'Internet use' policy governing patrons' use of the Internet.
These policies set forth the conditions under which patrons are permitted to access and use the
library's Internet resources").
181. CIPA leaves the definition of "inappropriate matter" to local communities, specifically, to a
'school board, local educational agency, library, or other authority responsible for making the
determination." 47 U.S.C. § 254()(2). The determinations made by these local agencies are not
reviewable by the federal government. Id.
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identification and use of measures designed to keep minors from accessing
harmful materials.182 At least one public hearing, following adequate
public notice, must be held by libraries and schools covered
under this
183
section to review their proposed Internet safety policies.
Although CIPA amends all three affected technology funding programs
to allow technology protection measures to be disabled by authorized
authorities' 84 "to enable access [for] bona fide research or other lawful
purposes, ' 85 institutions receiving E-rate funds are only allowed to do so
for adult computer users.' 86 Under no circumstances is a school or library
receiving E-rate funds allowed to provide unfiltered Internet access for
minors.1 87 The statute leaves unexplained why the same requirement is not
applied to ESEA and LSTA fund recipient schools and libraries, which are
allowed to disable their technology protection measures for bona fide
88
research and other lawful purposes without regard to the age of the user.
C. Government Rationalefor CIPA
In CIPA, Congress believes that it has finally found an approach to
regulate Internet content that can survive constitutional scrutiny. Indeed,
unlike the CDA and COPA, CIPA does not directly proscribe speech of
any kind. Nor does CIPA attempt to enforce criminal or even civil
penalties for its violation as the flawed federal statutes that preceded it had

182. Id. § 254(i)(1)(A).
183. Id. § 254(0(B).
184. All three funding statutes affected by CIPA define a person who is allowed to disable
technology protection measures as "an administrator, supervisor, or other person authorized by the
certifying authority." See 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(5)(D) for schools and 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)(D) for
libraries receiving E-rate discounts; 20 U.S.C. § 6777(c) for schools receiving ESEA funds; and 20
U.S.C. § 9134 (0(3) for libraries receiving LSTA funds.
185. None of the affected statutes' disabling provisions define the terms "bona fide research" or
"other lawful purpose." See 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(5)(D) for schools and 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)(D) for
libraries receiving E-rate discounts; 20 U.S.C. § 6777(c) for schools receiving ESEA funds; and, 20
U.S.C. §9134 (0(3) for libraries receiving LSTA funds. This lack of definition was a significant factor
in American Library Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. Pa. 2002). See discussion
infra, Part V.C.3.
186. 47 U.S.C. §§ 254(h)(5)(D), (6)(D).
187. Id. Schools and libraries receiving E-rate funds cannot provide unfiltered access even to
minors whose parents have specifically given them permission to gain such access. The court in
American Library Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 201 U.S. 401 noted that, unlike the variable obscenity
law reviewed in Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), CIPA does not allow parents the
authority to permit their children to access materials that would be otherwise proscribed by the statute.
The court also noted that this omission from CIPA was shared by the Communications Decency Act,
which the Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional in Reno H.See Am. LibraryAss 'n, Inc., 201
F. Supp. 2d at 482.
188. See 20 U.S.C. § 6777(c) and 20 U.S.C. § 9134(0(3) for disabling technology protection
measures for ESEA and LSTA recipients, respectively.
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done. The law's proponents admit that they seek to impose conditions on
federal funding in order to induce fund recipients to assist in governmental
efforts to shield minors from online access to materials that they believe to
be harmful. 189 Proponents describe this as an uncontroversial exercise of
Congress's prerogative to distribute federal largess in any way that it feels
is rationally related to the general welfare. 90 No unconstitutional impact is
made on speech, the argument goes, because CIPA does not require
schools and libraries to apply Internet filters to its computers but merely
conditions the receipt of federal funds on the acceptance of that
condition.' 9' Any school or library that finds this condition coercive is free
to reject it, understanding of course that this decision will come at a
cost.' 92 Even after refusing to filter and losing the funds made contingent
by CIPA, schools and libraries need only change their minds and apply
Internet filters to become eligible, again, to apply for those funds. 193 Using
this approach, the government argues that CIPA's specific purpose is
merely an exercise of its administrative prerogative-in this case, assuring
that federal funds supplied for library and school technology are not used
to facilitate access to online materials that have no connection to those
institutions' educational missions.' 94 It is clear, however, that as long as

189. See, e.g., 146 CONG. REC. S5838 (daily ed. June 27, 2000) (statement of Sen. John McCain)
("When a school or library accepts federal dollars through the Universal Service fund, they become a
partner with the federal government in pursuing the compelling interest of protecting children.").
190. Typical is the view of CIPA proponent Rep. Chip Pickering who, in a prepared statement to a
House subcommittee reviewing the E-rate and filtering, concluded that:
CIPA is constitutional because the conditions imposed on public libraries for receiving
federal funds for Intemet access are 'reasonably calculated to promote the general welfare'
and are 'related to a national concern.' Congress has the authority and responsibility to ensure
that federal funds are not used by government agencies (public schools and libraries) to
provide access to pornography that is illegal under federal law ....
See E-Rate and Filtering: A Review of the Children's Internet Protection Act: Hearing before the
House Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet of the Committee on Energy and
Commerce, 107th Cong. 6 (2001) (prepared statement of Rep. Chip Pickering).
191. See discussion of use of conditional subsidies, infra Part IV.
192. 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(5)(F)(l)-(ii).,
193. 47 U.S.C. § 254(h) states in pertinent part:
A school that has failed to comply with a certification ... may remedy the failure by ensuring
the use of its computers in accordance with such certification. Upon submittal ... of such
remedy, the school shall be eligible for services at discount rates ....
47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(5)(F)(iii)(II). 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)(F)(iii)(II) reads identically but is applied to
libraries.
194. CIPA's most zealous legislative sponsors seem oblivious to the possibility that withholding
federal technology funds from schools and libraries that refuse to filter Internet content could cause
constitutional problems. See, e.g., E-Rate and Filtering: A Review of the Children's Internet
Protection Act: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet of the
Committee on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 6 (2001) (statement of Rep. Charles W. Pickering),
availableat http://energycommerce.house.gov/107/action/107-33.pdf.
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the federal funds subject to sequester are sufficiently important to libraries
and schools to ensure that most will be compelled to accede to CIPA's
filtering prerequisite, Congress gains, as a secondary effect of its
conditional funding decision, much of the broad Internet content control
that it had tried and failed to achieve with the passage of the CDA and
COPA.
IV. CONGRESS'S SPENDING POWER AS A REGULATORY TOOL

A. Restrictions on the Spending Power
In order to avoid the strict First Amendment scrutiny that proved fatal
for the CDA and has rendered COPA unenforceable, the government must
prevail in characterizing CIPA as a permissible exercise of its spending
power rather than a direct regulation of speech. However, this
characterization relies on a highly selective application of legal principles
developed over the last seventy years that appear to give Congress virtual
carte blanche to control the activities of federal fund recipients.
Government confidence that spending power decisions will receive
judicial deference may be unfounded, particularly when funding
conditions compromise First Amendment rights.
Congress has at its disposal billions of dollars each year to fund various
federal and state programs that it adjudges to be in the interest of the
"general welfare."' 95 It is safe to say that almost all of these funds come
with some strings attached. Recipients typically have no constitutional
claim to these funds; rather, the Constitution's Spending Clause 196
provides Congress With largely unfettered discretion, to which the courts
[T]his [CIPA] is a common-sense mainstream constitutional way to protect our children from
child predators, from obscenity, from child pornography, that which is already illegal. We
believe that the language and the legislation was very well crafted, taking lessons from recent
communications efforts to restrict this type of material, but that was unsuccessfully ruled
against--or it was ruled that it was unconstitutional in the courts. We believe that we avoided
those pitfalls and those problems by the way that we crafted the language. This is an issue of
funding, and it is an issue of child safety. And just as we give incentives to have alcohol
blood limits or seat belt restraints for safety of the public, we believe for the safety of our
children as well as preventing that which is illegal, child pornography and obscenity, and
having access through our schools and through our libraries with federal subsidies. And we
believe that this is a very mainstream, common-sense approach, and that the agenda of the
other side who opposes is out of the mainstream. It is extreme. It would put our children at
risk.
Id.
195. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936).
196. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8 ("The Congress shall have Power to ...provide for the common
Defence and general Welfare of the United States ....
").
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typically defer, to define how public funds can best be used to promote the
general welfare. 197 Recognizing that this judicial deference to federal
spending decisions can provide a path of least resistance in troublesome
regulatory matters, Congress, during the last half of the twentieth century,
increasingly relied upon its power to place conditions upon the distribution
of federal largess.1 98 In fact, regulation through its spending power has
become one of the primary tools Congress uses to control the activities of
prospective funding recipients in ways that conform to its vision of
contemporary federal policy because this frequently avoids many of the
troublesome constitutional barriers that would make such control
if not impossible, if they were attempted as direct statutory
problematic,
199
mandates.
In describing CIPA as a routine use of broad spending powers granted
to Congress under the Spending Clause, the government relied upon a
series of Supreme Court decisions begun in the 1920s and developed
during the 1930s that appear to provide ample justification for the view
that Congress's ability to place conditions on the distribution of federal

197. That judgment has specifically been ruled to be a matter of congressional, not judicial,
discretion. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937). See also Erwin Chemerinsky, Protectingthe
Spending Power, 4 CHAP. L. REv. 89, 90-92 (2001) ("The Court [has] held that Congress has broad
power to tax and spend for the general welfare so long as it does not violate other constitutional
provisions."); Georges Nahitchevansky, Note, Free Speech and Government Funding: Does the
Government Have to Fund What it Doesn't Like? 56 BROOK. L. REv. 213, 219 (1990) ("Because there
is no entitlement to public funds, the government is generally free to determine how it should allocate
its subsidies.").
198. See Brett D. Proctor, Note, Using the Spending Power to Circumvent City of Boerne v.
Flores: Why the Court Should Require Constitutional Consistency in its Unconstitutional Conditions
Analysis, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 469, 469 (2000) ("Congress's power to condition its discretionary
allocations of funds is remarkably broad .... Because of this historical trend, the spending power has
been invoked repeatedly in recent years as the clearest, and perhaps only, tool with which Congress
might circumvent the Supreme Court's apparent willingness to enforce federalism-based constitutional
norms.").
199. After more than fifty years of increasingly broad interpretations of the congressional
spending power, the 1990s witnessed what some commentators have called a "new federalism" in
which courts signaled a willingness to alter or abandon the Butler and Dole line of wide-open
deference to congressional spending decisions. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552
(1995) (quoting James Madison, who said that "[tihe powers delegated by the ... Constitution to the
federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are
numerous and indefinite."). See also Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95
COLUM. L. REv. 1911, 1920 (1995) ("So long as the Commerce Clause is not interpreted to grant
Congress plenary power to regulate the states directly, the Tenth Amendment's reservation to the
states of all powers not delegated to the federal government has content and significance."). But see
Chemerinsky, supra note 197, at 96-104 (arguing against using the Tenth Amendment to limit
congressional spending power).
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funds is virtually unlimited and immune from judicial challenge. 2°0 The
Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that the Spending Clause gives
Congress an independent grant of legislative authority distinct from that
which is specifically enumerated in Article I, Section 8 of the
Constitution. 20 1 The spending power has been interpreted to be an
independent legislative authority 20 2 that allows Congress to "further broad
policy objectives by conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon
compliance by
the recipient with federal statutory and administrative
20 3
directives."
Despite the seemingly unlimited reach of the power afforded to
Congress in making spending decisions, a number of purported limitations
on this power have emerged from the body of Supreme Court opinions
interpreting its use. The contemporary opinion that most comprehensively
summarizes the Court's modem view of the parameters of Congress's
spending power is South Dakota v. Dole.20 4 Despite Dole's establishment
of a set of possible limitations on Congress's spending power, these
limitations, as applied by the courts over the last sixty-five years, have
proven to be more theoretical than real.
In Dole, South Dakota challenged a federal statute authorizing the
Secretary of Transportation to withhold highway funds from states that
refused to raise their minimum drinking age to twenty-one, ostensibly to
200. See Baker, supra note 199, at 1924-31 (reviewing the line of opinions between 1923 and
1993 in which the Supreme Court uniformly deferred to Congress's authority and discretion to place
conditions on the distribution of federal funds).
201. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (citing United States v. Butler, 297
U.S. 1, 65).
202. The first Supreme Court case to state this proposition, United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1
(1936), has been cited regularly in support of the concept that "the power of Congress to authorize
expenditure of public moneys for public purposes is not limited by the direct grants of legislative
power found in the Constitution." Id. at 66. See also Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-41 (1937)
(holding that Congress, and not the courts, has discretion to determine what constitutes the "general
welfare"); Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (reaffirming that "objectives not thought to be within Article I's
'enumerated legislative fields' may nevertheless be attained through the use of the spending power and
the conditional grant of federal funds") (citing Butler, 297 U.S. at 65-66).
203. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980). See also Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 569
(1974) ("The Federal Government has power to fix the terms on which its money allotments to the
States shall be disbursed."); Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 295 (1958) (stating
that the constitutionality of the federal government imposing "reasonable conditions on the use of
federal funds, federal property, and federal privileges" is "beyond challenge"); Oklahoma v. Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 144 (1947) ("The offer of benefits to a state by the United States
dependent upon cooperation by the state with federal plans, assumedly for the general welfare, is not
unusual."); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 612 (1937) (finding no encroachment on state
authority when conditions are placed on federal aid "which the state, without surrendering any of its
powers may accept or not as it chooses").
204. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
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promote Congress's interest in "safe interstate travel. 2 °5 Although the
Court upheld the statute as a "valid use of the spending power, ' 20 6 it made
2 7 The Court
clear that Congress's spending power is "not unlimited.
2
08
identified four restrictions on use of the spending power.
The first general restriction comes from the language of the Spending
Clause itself, which states that Congress may use its spending power to
provide for "the general welfare" of the United States. 2°9 In considering
210
the definition of that phrase, the Court has chosen to interpret it broadly,
deferring almost entirely to Congress's judgment and discretion in
determining when a particular spending decision appropriately supports
the "general welfare." 2 1 The Court has said that it is not proper for the
judiciary to substitute its judgment for that of Congress in making this
determination unless the choice made is "clearly wrong, a display of
arbitrary power, [or] not an exercise of judgment., 212 Although the cases
do not define these terms with specificity, the Court has stated that the
burden rests with the party claiming that Congress has abused its spending
power to show that "by no reasonable possibility can the challenged
legislation fall within the wide range of discretion permitted to the
Congress. 2 13 In Dole, the Court ruled that Congress had surmounted the
"general welfare" restriction simply by declaring drinking drivers under
the age of1twenty-one
to be a "dangerous situation" in need of a "national
24
solution."
The second general restriction discussed in Dole requires that, when

205. Id. at 208.
206. Id. at 212.
207. Id. at 207 (citing Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 & n.13
(1981)).
208. Id. at 207-08.
209. Id. at 207 (quoting Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-41 (1937)).
210. Butler, 297 U.S. at 65-66. In Butler, the Court analyzed the competing interpretations
ascribed to the phrase "to provide for the general welfare of the United States" by founding fathers
James Madison and Alexander Hamilton. As between Madison's view that the phrase was confined to
the powers directly granted to Congress in Article I and Hamilton's view that the clause conferred
upon Congress powers independent of those specifically enumerated, the Butler court held that
Hamilton's is the "true construction" of the phrase. Id. at 66.
211. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (citing Helvering,301 U.S. at 640-41).
212. Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640.
213. Id. at 641 (quoting Butler, 297 U.S. at 67).
214. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208. The Court took recognition of a Presidential Commission report of
which, ostensibly, Congress was aware when passing the legislation in question; the report supports
the view that the lack of uniform drinking ages among the states creates an incentive to drink and drive
in states where drinking age is lower. Id. at 209. Regardless of one's intuitive agreement or
disagreement with that general finding, it can hardly be said that the Court required Congress to
provide anything beyond the barest justification that the purpose of the conditional funding statute was
within the nation's general welfare.
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Congress places conditions on funding, it must do so "unambiguously" so
that recipients may "exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the
consequences of their participation." 2 15 This is because legislation
invoking Congress's spending power is "much in the nature of a
contract" 216 and is only legitimate when the recipient "voluntarily and
knowingly accepts the terms of the 'contract.' ' 217 This requirement was
met in Dole, where states that permitted those under age twenty-one to
drink could not receive federal highway funds. The Court found that "[t]he
conditions upon which States receive the funds ... could not be more

clearly stated by Congress. 21 8
Dole's third restriction on funding conditions requires that the
restrictions relate "to the federal interest in particular national projects or
programs., 21 9 Because South Dakota did not challenge Congress's
argument that the conditions it had placed on highway funds were directly
related to concerns about safe interstate travel, the Court found no reason
to declare that these conditions had run afoul of the germaneness
restriction.220
As its fourth general restriction, the Dole Court observed that "other
constitutional provisions may provide an independent bar to the
conditional grant of federal funds. 221 South Dakota argued that this
restriction should apply on the theory that the Twenty-first Amendment
prohibited a direct mandate of a national minimum drinking age and that
any use by Congress of its spending power to achieve that end indirectly
would be equally barred.222 The Court stated that this restriction in no way

215. Id. at 207 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).
216. Pennhurst,451 U.S. at 17.
217. Id. ("There can, of course, be no knowing acceptance if a State is unaware of the conditions
or is unable to ascertain what is expected of it.").
218. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208.
219. Id. at 207-08 (citing Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978) (plurality
opinion)).
220. Id. at 208. But see Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994) (holding that "the
government may not require a person to give up a constitutional right-here the right to receive just
compensation when property is taken for a public use-in exchange for a discretionary benefit
conferred by the government where the benefit sought has little or no relationship to the property."). In
Dolan, the Court required an "essential nexus" between protected speech and the imposed restriction.
Id. at 386. See also Angel D. Mitchell, Comment, ConditionalFederalFunding to the States: The New
FederalismDemands a Close Examinationfor UnconstitutionalConditions,48 U. KAN. L. REv. 161,
176-77 (1999) (observing that since the late 1980s, the Court has "indulged in a more meaningful
germaneness inquiry for unconstitutional conditions under the Takings Clause").
221. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208 (citing Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist., 469 U.S. 256,
269-70 (1985); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 91 (1976) (per curiam); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309,
333 n.34 (1968)).
222. Id. at 209-10.
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limited the general proposition that Congress can use its spending power
to achieve policy objectives that it could not achieve through direct
statutory mandates; rather, it simply bars Congress from using that power
"to induce the States to engage in activities that would themselves be
unconstitutional. 223 The Court ruled that although the Twenty-first
Amendment prohibits Congress from mandating a national minimum
drinking age, there is no constitutional bar against using "blandishments
offered by Congress ' 224 to225induce a state to raise its own minimum
drinking age to twenty-one.
Dole also recognized that excessive coercion could affect the
permissibility of federal spending conditions.226 For as long as the Court
has reviewed challenges of the congressional spending power, it has
recognized the potential for federal economic pressure on both the states
and individual funding recipients that "pass[es] the point at which
'pressure turns into compulsion.' ' 227 In United States v. Butler, the Court's
earliest examination of this subject, it spoke of "[t]he power to confer or
withhold unlimited benefits [as] the power to coerce or destroy ' 228 and
suggested that economic pressure can become so extreme that the
supposed choice offered to funding recipients is, in fact, illusory.229 In the
case of conditional funding offers to the states, the Court has suggested
that the line between permissible pressure and impermissible coercion is
or impair state
crossed where conditions offered effectively destroy
230
autonomy to decide between accepting or declining.

223. Id. at 210. As examples of spending conditions that would be barred under this restriction,
the Court lists conditional funding offers that require states to engage in "invidiously discriminatory"
actions or the "infliction of cruel and unusual punishment." Id.
224. Id. at 211.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)). Although many courts
pay "lip service" to the theory that excessive coercion could limit the use of Congress's spending
power, they have been unwilling to apply this theory in practice. See Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1415, 1428-42 (1989) (reviewing the "coercion
debate" in cases).
228. 297 U.S. 1,71 (1936).
229. Id.
230. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 586 (1937). In both Butler and New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), the Court found that the federal government's conditional offers
encroached on powers reserved for the states in violation of the Tenth Amendment. Each Court,
however, arrived at that result from different perspectives. In Butler, the Court held that the
government's attempt to regulate local agricultural production simply was not within any express or
implied power of the federal government. In New York a federal condition requiring the state to "take
title" to, and responsibility for, damages from low-level radioactive waste ran afoul of the Tenth
Amendment, as well, not because the federal government had encroached on reserved powers of the
states, but because the funding "options" presented "[a] choice between two constitutionally coercive
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B. ConditionalFunding in the FirstAmendment Context
Although the courts have displayed an almost pristine record of
deference to Congress concerning the conditions placed on recipients of
federal funds in most contexts,23' the judiciary has been far less reluctant
to examine critically congressional attempts to implement funding
conditions affecting First Amendment rights. Freedom of speech is one of
our most cherished fundamental rights, and the First Amendment is
designed to ensure that no laws are made that will directly interfere with
that right. Nevertheless, the First Amendment itself places no affirmative
obligation on the federal government to fund speech. To say that the
government may not directly impinge on a citizen's right of free speech is
not to say that the state has the obligation to fund the exercise of speechrelated activity. 232 Certainly, "[r]efusing to fund speech.. . is not identical
to prohibiting it."' 233 As discussed in the previous section, Congress's
distribution of federal funds is discretionary; no one is entitled, by right, to
receive a government subsidy to facilitate her First Amendment
expressions.234
Frequently, however, Congress does subsidize speech that either
conveys the government's own message or facilitates private,
nongovernmental expression. While, as with other decisions concerning
federal spending, Congress has broad discretion to decide what speech it
will subsidize and under what conditions, the fundamental nature of First
Amendment rights and the possibility that conditional funding discretion
regulatory techniques," each beyond the authority of Congress. 505 U.S. at 176. The Court held that by
presenting the state with no alternative but to follow one of two federal regulatory paths, "the Act
commandeer[ed] the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and
enforce a federal regulatory program." 505 U.S. at 176 (citing Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)). But see Dole, 483 U.S. at 210 (holding that the Tenth
Amendment's limitation on congressional regulation of state affairs does not concomitantly limit the
range of conditions legitimately placed on federal grants).
231. See Rebecca E. Zietlow, Federalism's Paradox: The Spending Power and Waiver of
Sovereign Immunity, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 141, 182 (2002) (questioning why, in the light of Dole,
the courts have been so reluctant to apply these restrictions "to [limit] Congress's ability to effect
policy .... "). The author goes on to state that judicial deference for federal spending conditions has
been so complete that the courts impose no "meaningful limitations" on Congress's spending power.
Id.
232. The government is under no obligation to subsidize speech rights. See Regan v. Taxation
with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 546 (1983) (citing Cammarano v. United States,
358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959) (holding that Congress is not obligated to subsidize lobbying)).
233. David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in
Government-FundedSpeech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 675, 681 (1992).
234. See, e.g., Regan, 461 U.S. at 546 ("We again reject the 'notion that First Amendment rights
are somehow not fully realized unless they are subsidized by the State."') (quoting Cammarano v.
United States, 358 U.S. 498, 515 (1959)).
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could be abused to effect government viewpoint censorship on expression
has led the Supreme Court to consider the parameters of Congress's
spending power when funding of speech is involved. 235 Because the line
between legitimate government discretion and impermissible viewpoint
restriction is not easily discerned,236 Supreme Court consideration of
particular funding challenges has been contradictory and confused.
1. ConstitutionalParameterson ConditionalFundingof Speech
Between June 1958 and February 1959, the Supreme Court embarked
on two lines of decisions that have since been applied to challenges of
governmental conditions on funding of speech and other fundamental
rights. The first line of cases, initiated with the Court's holding in Speiser
v. Randall,237 applies the venerable doctrine of "unconstitutional
conditions" to strike down funding conditions that require beneficiaries to
forego "preferred constitutional rights" 238 With which the government
could not directly interfere. The second line of cases, begun just eight
months after Speiser with the Court's opinion in Cammarano v. United
States,239 has been applied to uphold funding conditions in which the
Court supported the government's discretion to restrict activities, even if
constitutionally protected, that it has chosen not to subsidize.
Because these doctrines will likely be considered in a future Supreme
Court review of CIPA's constitutionality, a brief analysis of the Court's
development of each is essential to gain some perspective on the
philosophical conflicts and doctrinal complexity that the Court will face. 4 °
Inherent in this analysis is a tension between the deference typically
235. "[T]he more narrow the range of speech that the government chooses to subsidize (whether
directly, through government grants or other funding, or indirectly, through the creation of a public
forum) the more deference the First Amendment accords the government in drawing content-based
distinctions." Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401,458. Conversely, the Court has
said "[tihe more broadly the government facilitates private speech, however, the less deference the
First Amendment accords to the government's content-based restrictions on the speech that it
facilitates." Id. at 460.
236. Nahitchevansky, supra note 197, at 224.
237. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
238. Sullivan, supra note 227.
Not all constitutional rights are implicated in unconstitutional conditions cases. By its very
nature, the doctrine serves to protect only those rights that depend on some sort of exercise of
autonomous choice by the rightholder, such as individual rights to speech, exercise of religion
or privacy, corporate rights to do interstate business or invoke federal diversity jurisdiction, or
state rights to self-government.
Id. at 1426.
239. 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
240. See generally Baker, supra note 199; Cole, supra note 233; Sullivan, supra note 227.
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afforded Congress when making routine benefit allocations and the strict
constitutional scrutiny that the courts have applied when Congress attaches
conditions to those benefits that impinge on fundamental constitutional
rights.2 4' Whereas the Court has traditionally reviewed government
spending decisions with great deference, statutes that unconstitutionally
condition the receipt of federal benefits on the relinquishment of a
fundamental right are typically subjected to strict scrutiny.
In Speiser, the Court struck down a California constitutional provision
requiring that World War II veterans submit a loyalty oath as a condition
of eligibility for a state property tax exemption specifically limited to
veterans.242 In striking down this law, the Court stated that the denial of a
benefit based on claimants' refusal to surrender their right of free speech
effectively "penalize[s] them for such speech '2 43 and equated the deterrent
effect of such a penalty to be "the same as if the State were to fine them
for this speech. 244 The Court rejected California's contention that the tax
exemption in question was merely a "privilege" or a "bounty" that it could
freely deny without First Amendment implications, 245 describing the
state's primary motivation to be the impermissible suppression of
unpopular or "dangerous" ideas.246 Although the state had no obligation to
confer a tax exemption on veterans at all, the Court concluded that, once
the exemption was established, the state could not coercively use its
spending power to effect speech restrictions that "if directly attempted
would be unconstitutional. 2 47
More than a decade after its decision in Speiser, the Court virtually
repeated that holding in Perry v. Sindermann.248 In Perry, the Court held
that a state junior college teacher could not be denied renewal of his
employment contract merely because he had publicly criticized the
school's administration. 249 Again, as in Speiser, the Court held that while
no one has a right to receive a government benefit, it is not permissible for
the government to deny such benefits in a way that "infringes his
constitutionally protected interests-especially, his interest in freedom of

241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

Sullivan, supra note 227, at 1422.
Speiser, 357 U.S. at 528-29.
Id. at 518.
Id.
Id.
Id. at519.
Id. at 518.
408 U.S. 593 (1972).
Id. at 598.
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speech. 250 To do so would be to "penalize[] and inhibit[]" 25 1a
fundamental right and would2 52"produce a result which [the government]
could not command directly.
Taken together, Speiser and Perry are textbook examples of the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine in its purest form. Under this doctrine,
originated in the early 1900s in Lochner v. New Yorl2 53 and frequently, if
inconsistently, applied by courts and First Amendment scholars since then,
the doctrine's basic premise is that the "government may not condition
benefits on the forfeiture of constitutional rights."2 54 Used at its inception
to protect economic liberties of "foreign corporations and private
truckers, 255 the Supreme Court gradually shifted the doctrine's focus to
the protection of personal liberties and has applied it many times to
invalidate governmental restrictions that made receipt of benefits
conditional upon surrender of First Amendment rights. 6 But, as a
doctrine built on such subjective concepts as coercion and penalty, it has
been inconsistently and, at times, inexplicably implemented. 7 As applied
in Speiser and Perry, the Court has at its disposal a tool that can be, and
has been, used to invalidate government attempts to force recipients to
258
surrender constitutional rights in return for government benefits.
However, within months of its holding in Speiser, the Court developed
a competing approach in Cammarano v. United States,259 upholding the
constitutionality of offers of conditional benefits that affect recipients'
constitutional rights. In Cammarano, the Court upheld Internal Revenue
Service regulations that denied tax deductions for expenditures associated
with political lobbying.2 60 The regulations were challenged on First
Amendment grounds by individuals who claimed that the deductions had
been unconstitutionally conditioned on their willingness to surrender their
right to engage in political speech in direct conflict with the doctrine
espoused in Speiser. In a neat bit of conceptual legerdemain, the Court

250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

Id. at 597.
Id.
Id. (quoting Speiser, 357 U.S. at 526).
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
Cole, supra note 233, at 679.
Sullivan, supra note 227, at 1416.

256. Id.
257. Id. at 1434-36.
258. See generally Mitchell, supra note 220, at 172-76 (providing a detailed discussion of the
coercion, penalty, and nonsubsidy theories emerging from Speiser, Perry, and related opinions).
259. 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
260. Id. at 513.
261. Id. at 512-13.
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distinguished the two cases, ruling that the claimants in Cammarano were
denied a tax exemption not because they refused to surrender their
protected lobbying activities, but because the government had simply
decided that they should bear the cost of those activities themselves.26 2
Because the regulations applied this denial of benefits to everyone in a
nondiscriminatory way, were not "aimed at the suppression of dangerous
ideas, '263 and did not extinguish all avenues for the claimants to exercise
their constitutionally protected activity (albeit, not at government
expense), the Court was unwilling to disrupt Congress's discretionary
decision not to subsidize political lobbying with tax benefits.26 4
The Court subsequently extended its holding in Cammarano to
protected constitutional rights in Maher v. Roe265 and Harrisv. McRae.266
At issue in each case were Medicaid policies that called for coverage of
medical expenses related to childbirth, but excluded similar expenses
related to abortion.2 67 Clarifying a key point in Cammarano, the Court
held that the unconstitutional conditions challenges to the policies in
question were inappropriate because the government had not totally
foreclosed the claimants' rights to abortions on their own time and with
their own funds.268 The policies in question merely defined the scope of
the benefit and did not attempt to proscribe abortions outside the Medicaid
program; the Court concluded that the government was under no
obligation to subsidize activity that it did not favor.269 Because there is no

262. Id. at 513 ("Petitioners are not being denied a tax deduction because they engage in
constitutionally protected activities, but are simply being required to pay for those activities entirely
out of their own pockets, as everyone else engaging in similar activities is required to do under the ...
Internal Revenue Code.").
263. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (quoting American Communications Ass'n v. Douds,
339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950)).
264. See Amy E. Moody, Comment, ConditionalFederal Grants: Can the Government Undercut
Lobbying by Nonprofits Through Conditions Placed on Federal Grants?, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REv. 113, 129 (1996).
265. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
266. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
267. See Maher, 432 U.S. at 464 (1977) (reviewing a three-judge district court holding that "the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the exclusion of nontherapeutic
abortions from a state welfare program that generally subsidizes the medical expenses incident to
pregnancy and childbirth"); Harris, 448 U.S. at 303 (1980) (alleging that a federal Medicaid rule
limiting the funding of abortions to those necessary to save the life of the mother while permitting the
funding of costs associated with childbirth violates affected claimants' First, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth
Amendment rights).
268. See Maher, 432 U.S. at 474 ("The Connecticut regulation places no obstacles absolute or
otherwise in the pregnant woman's path to an abortion."); Harris, 448 U.S. at 315-18 (holding that
there is "no governmental obstacle in the path of a woman who chooses to terminate her pregnancy").
269. Id. The Court in Maher spoke of the latitude given the state in its use of spending to
encourage particular activities:
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affirmative duty for the government to fund even fundamental rights, a
refusal to subsidize those rights does not effect an unconstitutional
condition on those who are refused federal benefits.27 °
Having set the foundation for its unconstitutional conditions and
nonsubsidy lines of conditional benefit analyses, the Court continued to
refine each over the next two decades, often drawing inexplicably fine
distinctions in choosing the application of one doctrine over the other in
strikingly similar scenarios. Typically, the Court's choice depends upon its
characterization of how coercion imposed by the government ultimately
affects funding recipients' ability to engage in constitutionally protected
activities.27 1 In cases where the Court concludes that funding conditions
are so coercive that they leave recipients with no choice but to forego
constitutionally protected activity, the Court is able to declare this
condition to be a penalty and invoke the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine to reject it. 272 Invoking unconstitutional conditions subjects the
challenged funding conditions to strict scrutiny and obliges the
government to justify its actions against the most rigorous standard of
constitutional review. 273 In contrast, when the Court finds that a funding
condition merely structures a program to support federally encouraged
activities without precluding recipients' exercise of constitutionally
protected activity on their own time and with their own money, the Court
can uphold the challenged conditions as a mere nonsubsidy.274 A
characterization of a condition as a nonsubsidy requires only that it be
shown to be "rationally related" to government's interests to survive
constitutional scrutiny.275 It appears that the Court has given itself two
There is a basic difference between direct state interference with a protected activity and state
encouragement of an alternative activity consonant with legislative policy. Constitutional
concerns are greatest when the State attempts to impose its will by force of law; the State's
power to encourage actions deemed to be in the public interest is necessarily far broader.
432 U.S. at 475-76. See also Harris, 448 U.S. at 316 ("[lit simply does not follow that a woman's
freedom of choice carries with it a constitutional entitlement to the financial resources to avail herself
of the full range of protected choices.").
270. See Maher, 432 U.S. at 474-75; Harris,448 U.S. at 316-18.
271. Sullivan, supra note 227, at 1434-36.
272. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (denying welfare benefits to residents
residing in a state for less than one year penalizes the fundamental right of interstate travel); Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (ruling that a condition on receipt of unemployment benefits tied to an
agreement to choose between work and religious observance has the effect of coercing the recipient to
refrain from protected speech); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (invalidating a state
requirement that conditioned World War II veterans' receipt of veterans' property tax exemptions on
taking a loyalty oath).
273. See supra text accompanying notes 237-58.
274. Sullivan, supra note 227, at 1439 ("'Penalties' coerce; 'nonsubsidies' do not.").
275. Having developed a theory allowing it to apply strict scrutiny to funding conditions viewed
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result-oriented doctrines to call upon to resolve challenges to conditional
benefit cases as it sees fit.276 The Court's method of analysis has led
commentators to conclude simply that "[i]f the Court wishes to strike
down a condition, it declares it to be an unconstitutional condition; if the
Court wishes to uphold a condition, it declares that the government is
making a permissible choice to subsidize some activities and not
others. 27 7
.
The impending Supreme Court review of the constitutionality of CIPA
is likely to depend, in part, on which of these competing doctrines the
Court chooses to apply to this statute. If CIPA's challengers are able to
convince the Court that the Act's requirement that public libraries install
software filters on their Intemet-accessible computers coerces them to
choose between sacrificing First Amendment rights and accepting much
needed technology funds, the challengers will have opened a line of First
Amendment attack that would require CIPA to withstand strict scrutiny
analysis. If, however, the government is able to convince the Court that it
is not obligated to subsidize unrestricted access to the Internet in public
libraries but, rather, is free to condition library technology funding to
discourage access to particular kinds of speech with government funds,
as coercing recipients into foregoing fundamental constitutional rights, the Court soon developed a
counterbalancing theory that allowed it to provide greater constitutional deference in cases where it did
not view Congress's funding conditions as coercion or penalties. For an extensive discussion of the
Court's nonsubsidy analysis, see generally Gary A. Winters, Note, Unconstitutional Conditions as
"Nonsubsidies": When Is Deference Inappropriate?80 GEO. L.J. 131 (1991).
When taking the nonsubsidy view, the Court argues that differential subsidies affecting rights
are allocative choices made by a government with virtually no affirmative responsibilities.
The subsidies need only pass the test of minimum rationality applicable to classifications that
do not affect constitutional rights. Thus, the court begins from the assumption that the benefit
scheme is constitutional, and demands that beneficiaries show why the scheme cannot pass
the test.
Id. at 148.
276. A number of commentators have noted that the Court's categorization of a particular funding
condition as either coercion/penalty or a mere nonsubsidy depends, almost entirely, on whether it
wants the result of its opinion to strike those conditions or uphold them. See Sullivan, supra note 227,
at 1420 ("Conclusory labels often take the place of analysis-for example, conditioned benefits are
frequently deemed 'penalties' when struck down and 'nonsubsidies' when upheld."). See also Michael
W. McConnell, The Selective Funding Problem: Abortions and Religious Schools, 104 HARV. L. REv.
989, 992 (1991) (observing that the Court tends "to approach the problem of selective funding by
reasoning backward from a desired result"); Harold B. Walther, Note, National Endowment for the
Arts v. Finley: Sinking Deeper Into the Abyss of the Supreme Court's Unintelligible Modern
UnconstitutionalConditions Doctrine, 59 MD. L. REv. 225, 250-51 ("[The Court's] unconstitutional
conditions decisions now amount to judicial policymaking, with the Court seemingly reaching
decisions through a results oriented approach rather than through the application of a cognizable
unconstitutional conditions doctrine.").
277. Mitchell, supra note 220, at 173 (quoting ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, 11.2.4.4 at 795 (1997)).
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CIPA will be subjected to a greatly reduced standard of constitutional
analysis and is likely to be upheld. Although the choice remains elusive,
particularly after American LibraryAssociation v. United States,278 a close
examination of the latest unconstitutional conditions and nonsubsidy cases
suggests both that the government has read the Supreme Court's
nonsubsidy cases too broadly and that the selective subsidization of speech
in public libraries violates the First Amendment.
2. Rust v. Sullivan and the Nonsubsidy Doctrine in Ascendancy
In Rust v. Sullivan, the Court authored its most comprehensive
endorsement to date of the government's broad powers of choice in
deciding what speech to subsidize with federal funds. 279 The Court upheld
Health and Human Services regulations that restricted family planning
clinics funded under Title X of the Public Health Services Act 280 from
counseling clients about abortion 281 while placing no restrictions on other
forms of family planning, including anti-abortion advocacy. 28 2 The
plaintiffs claimed that placing conditions on Title X benefits that require
recipients to forego constitutionally protected speech about abortion
imposed an unconstitutional condition upon those funds.2 83 The Court
ruled, however, based upon an expansive interpretation of its nonsubsidy
line of cases, that the conditions did not exceed the parameters of the
government-funded program itself and in no way restricted fund recipients
or their clients from either providing or seeking abortion counseling
outside the auspices of the Title X-funded program.284
Drawing upon and extending earlier nonsubsidy decisions, 285 the Court
concluded that the government is allowed to make value judgments and
state preferences to encourage activities that it feels are in the public
interest within the confines of programs that it funds.2 86 Stating
preferences does not effect viewpoint discrimination but merely represents
a choice "to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other."2 87 The mere

278. See supra note 17.
279. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
280. 42 U.S.C §§ 300-300a-6 (1994).
281. Rust, 500 U.S. at 179-80.
282. Id. at 192.
283. Id. at 196.
284. Id. at 198-99.
285. Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983);
Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 598, 513 (1959).
286. Rust, 500 U.S. at 193.
287. Id.
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refusal to fund a protected activity does not impose the type of penalty on
that activity sufficient to trigger the application of the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine.2 88
The Court's ruling in Rust was seen by many as providing the
government carte blanche to place speech content restrictions within the
confines of federally funded programs. 289 Characterizing the government
as the "financier" of such speech, then Solicitor General Kenneth W. Starr
opined that the government could "take sides" and "have viewpoints"
when making funding decisions in the wake of Rust.290 Still others felt that
a logical extension of the holding in Rust would classify any governmentfunded speech to be speech by the government itself, which the
government could control as it saw fit. 29 1 At its most extreme, this
approach led the Court, in NationalEndowmentfor the Arts v. Finley,292 to
validate a statute requiring the National Endowment for the Arts to ensure
that "general standards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and
values of the American public" are taken into consideration when
reviewing grant applications.293 Although the majority opinion in Finley
glossed over the disturbing breadth of this quintessentially viewpointspecific standard by stating there is no "realistic danger" that First
Amendment rights will be compromised,2 94 Justice Scalia's concurrence
showed less reluctance to admit that the statute "unquestionably
constitutes viewpoint discrimination. 29 5 Justice Scalia, however, agreed
with the Court that it remains perfectly constitutional as a valid
"congressional determination to favor decency and respect for beliefs and
values over the opposite .... ,,296
It is upon this most expansive interpretation of Rust that the
government now relies in defending the constitutionality of CIPA.297 From
its perspective, restrictions on Internet content in public libraries accepting
federal funds are constitutional because the government has the discretion

288. Id.
289. Cole, supra note 233, at 676-77.
290. Id. at 676 (citing Ruth Marcus, Abortion-Advice Ban Upheldfor Federally Funded Clinics,
WASH. POST, May 24,1991, at A1, Al8).
291. Id. (citing Hearings on Implications of Rust v. Sullivan, Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 102d Cong., Ist Sess. 5 (1991) (statement of Leslie H.
Southwick, Asst. Att'y Gen., Civil Div., Dep't. of Justice)).
292. 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
293. Id. at 572.
294. Id. at 583.
295. Id. at 593 (Scalia, J., concurring).
296. Id. at 598 (Scalia, J., concurring).
297. Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 465 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (citing Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991)).

1074

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY

[VOL. 80:1025

to make choices about the type of activities to which it wants to "allocate
scarce resources. '298 Additionally, by virtue of choosing to subsidize
programs that feature speech, those who would rely on Rust believe that
the government, either directly or through private entities enlisted to
convey a governmental message, is in fact "the speaker" and thus is
allowed to make content-based decisions regarding the speech that it
funds.299 Under this line of reasoning, there can be no unconstitutional
condition applied by CIPA's filtering requirement because it does not
preclude recipients "from engaging in protected conduct outside the scope
of the federally funded program.' 300 Recipients can choose to accept or
reject the subsidy as they see fit.
Following this reasoning, the Court turned its own long-standing
enmity toward government imposition of content-based restrictions on
speech 30 1 on its head and threatened to make a mockery of its bedrock
principle that the government may not place restrictions on expression
simply because it finds the ideas expressed to be offensive or
disagreeable. 30 2 With this most expansive reading of Rust, the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine was eviscerated, and the likelihood
that government funding conditions on speech content could be
successfully challenged under traditional First Amendment strictures had
virtually disappeared.
The Court, however, has significantly qualified the power of the
government to control speech content through several landmark
discretionary funding decisions since Rust. If applied, the logic of these
decisions assures that the government will be unable to hide behind the
nonsubsidy doctrine to avoid examination of the First Amendment
implications of the CIPA filtering requirement. Although the holding in
Rust strongly supports broad governmental power to place conditions on
the speech of those organizations and individuals that it subsidizes, the
opinion's extensive dicta anticipates several possible scenarios where the

298. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981).
299. Rosenberger v. Rector& Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995).
300. Rust, 500 U.S. at 197.
301. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105, 116 (1991) (stating that govemment-imposed content restrictions on speech threaten to
"effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace. The First Amendment
presumptively places this sort of discrimination beyond the power of the government") (internal
citations omitted).
302. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 910 (1982) ("Speech does not
lose its protected character ... simply because it may embarrass other or coerce them into action.");
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978) ("[T]he fact that society may find speech
offensive is not sufficient reason for suppressing it.").
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Court would likely rule that such government controls are not permissible.
Most important among those is the Court's recognition that Rust-type
control would not be appropriate when the government provides funds to
encourage private, nongovernmental speech.
Rust suggests that the Court understands that not all speech in publicly
funded forums can be classified as government speech, stating that even
when the government funds a program and allows fund recipients to speak
outside the confines of the government-funded program, this is not
"invariably sufficient to justify Government control over the content of
expression." ' 30 3 The Court cited public forums as areas that have "been
traditionally open to the public for expressive activity' 30 4 or "expressly
dedicated to speech activity," 30 5 and universities as "traditional sphere[s]
30 6
of free expression ... fundamental to the functioning of ... society.'5

The Court stated that both were examples of the type of governmentfunded programs in which the withholding or manipulation of subsidies to
control the content of speech would not be appropriate, even where fund
recipients are free to express themselves outside the confines of the
subsidized program.30 7
3. Post-Rust Government Funding of PrivateSpeech
It took the Court only four years after Rust to consider the question of
government funding of private speech on its own merits. In Rosenbergerv.
Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia,30 8 the Court specifically
recognized the difference in the level of government control that is
permissible over private, as opposed to governmental, speech. In
Rosenberger, the Court struck down a university policy that refused to
fund student newspapers espousing a religious viewpoint despite
providing funds for other student publications. 30 9 The Court rejected the
university's arguments that it had the authority as a government-funded
entity, under Rust, to decide how to "allocate scarce resources to
accomplish its educational mission, 3'1 0 and that in doing so, "content303. Rust, 500 U.S. at 199.
304. Id. at 200 (quoting United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 726 (1990); Hague v. CIO, 307
U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (Roberts, J.)).
305. Id. (quoting Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 726; Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n,
460 U.S. 37,45 (1983)).
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
309. Id. at 837.
310. Id. at 832.
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based funding decisions are both inevitable and lawful.",31 ' The Court held
that "viewpoint-based restrictions are [not] proper when the University
does not itself speak or subsidize transmittal of a message it favors but
instead expends funds to encourage a diversity of views from private
speakers."'3 12 With this holding, the Court specifically limited and clarified
its holding in Rust, stating that the government is only permitted "to
regulate the content of what is or is not expressed when it is the speaker or
when it enlists private entities to convey its own message." 31 3 When, on
the other hand, federal funds are disbursed to "encourage a diversity of
views from private speakers," 314 even in limited public forum[s] of the
government's own making, 31 5 viewpoint-based restrictions are
constitutionally impermissible.3 16 With this holding, the Court returned to
its classic First Amendment principles that strenuously protect private
speech from governmental viewpoint restrictions.
In Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez,3 17 the Court further limited
Rust's application to cases in which the government finances private
speech. Here, the Court struck down a law that restricted attorneys
employed by the federally funded Legal Services Corporation (LSC) from
challenging the validity of existing welfare law.3 18 Concluding that
Congress had created the LSC specifically to assist clients in dealing with
a wide range of legal needs,31 9 including all aspects of welfare law,32 ° the
Court specifically stated that the factual setting of the LSC case was
"distinguishable from Rust '' 32 1 based on its conclusion that the advice
given by LSC attorneys to their clients "cannot be classified as
governmental speech even under a generous understanding of the

311. Id. at 833.
312. Id. at 834.
313. Id. at 833.
314. Id. at 834.
315. Id. at829.
316. Id. at 834. Despite a five-four split based on differing views about the holding's import as an
endorsement under the Establishment Clause of direct funding for religious activities, all nine Justices
agreed with the basic finding that a distinction exists between government speech and private speech.
Id. at 893 n.11.
317. 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
318. Id. at549.
319. Id. at 536 ("LSC's mission is to distribute funds appropriated by Congress ... 'for the
purpose of providing ... legal assistance in noncriminal proceedings or matters to persons financially
unable to afford legal assistance."') (quoting the Legal Services Corporation Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2996b(a)).
320. Id. at 542 ("The Government has designed this program to use the legal profession and the
established Judiciary of the United States and the Federal Government to accomplish its end of
assisting welfare claimants in determination or receipt of their welfare benefits.").
321. Id. at 543.
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concept., 322 The Court in Velazquez went further than Rosenberger in
making its point about the consequences of the government using its funds
to establish a forum for private speech. Drawing on its decision in FCC v.
League of Women Voters of California,323 the Velazquez Court stated that
when the government used a particular medium or forum to control private
expression, "[t]he First Amendment forbade the Government from using
the forum in an unconventional way to suppress speech inherent in the
nature of the medium." 324 The Court reasoned that restricting attorneys
from representing clients on particular issues found objectionable to the
government325"distorts the legal system by altering the traditional role of...
attorneys.,

The importance of these holdings cannot be overstated when assessing
the constitutional challenge of CIPA. The federal courts have classified
libraries as "limited public forums." 326 Further, courts have recognized that
libraries serve as the "quintessential locus of the receipt of information. ,0327

322. Id. at 542-43.
323. 468 U.S. 364 (1984) (striking down a provision of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 that
prohibited "editorializing" by any noncommercial educational broadcasting station receiving funds
from the Corporation for Public Broadcasting). Id. at 402. The Court rejected the government's
argument that the prohibition reflected a proper exercise by Congress of its spending power, as a
determination not to subsidize public broadcasting editorials, pointing out that the statute did not
permit a station to use other funds to carry on this activity, and thus completely foreclosed this type of
speech to any station receiving the public funds.) Id. at 399-400.
324. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 543 (summarizing FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S.
at 396-97).
325. Id. at 544. Justice Scalia strongly criticized the majority for its forum "distortion" analysis,
stating that it is "wrong on the law because there is utterly no precedent for the novel and facially
implausible proposition that the First Amendment has anything to do with government funding thatthough it does not abridge anyone's speech-distorts an existing medium of expression." Id. at 555
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
326. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Dist. of Columbia Pub. Library, 154 F. Supp. 2d 67, 75 (D.D.C.
2001) ("The parties correctly assert that a public library is a limited public forum for purposes of
constitutional analysis."); Sund v. City of Wichita Falls, 121 F. Supp. 2d 530, 548 (N.D. Tex. 2000)
("In a limited public forum, the government's ability to restrict patrons' First Amendment rights is
extremely narrow."); Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs. of the Loudoun County Library, 24 F. Supp.
2d 552, 563 (E.D. Va. 1998) (stating that because a public library is a limited public forum designed
for the "receipt and communication of information," any policy that "limits the receipt and
communication of information through the Intemet based on the content of that information, ... is
subject to a strict scrutiny analysis .... "); Kreimer v. Bureau of Police for the Town of Morristown,
958 F.2d 1242, 1262 (3d Cir. 1992) ("[A]s a limited public forum, the Library is obligated only to
permit the public to exercise rights that are consistent with the nature of the Library and consistent
with the government's intent in designating the Library as a public forum.").
327. Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1255. See also Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d
401, 457 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (stating that "the purpose of a public library in general, and the provision of
Intemet access within a public library in particular, is 'for use by the public ... for expressive
activity,' namely, the dissemination and receipt by the public of a wide range of information")
(citations omitted)).
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Chief Justice Rehnquist has characterized libraries as "designed for
freewheeling inquiry." 328 As such, libraries clearly have their place within
the "traditional sphere[s] of free expression" where the Court has
suggested that government subsidies must be administered with strict
neutrality.329 Public libraries are not intended to deliver governmental
messages; 330 rather they serve as "mighty resource[s] in the free
marketplace of ideas." 33 1 The fact that government E-rate and LSTA
subsidies assist libraries in offering the boundless resources of the Internet
supports, rather than contradicts, the argument that federal funds
encourage access to diverse private speech, just as the Court concluded the
government had done with its support of student newspapers in
Rosenbergerand legal services in Velazquez.
In the final analysis, the Supreme Court must decide which of the
divergent analytical paths it has developed to help resolve challenges to
congressional spending conditions should apply to the CIPA restrictions
on library funding. For CIPA to survive, it is crucial that the Court accept
the position that the Act's conditions on library funding fall within
Congress's broad spending power discretion and should be accorded full
judicial deference. As a corollary, the government will attempt to deflect
strict First Amendment scrutiny of CIPA by asking the Court to adopt the
Rust/Finley position that Congress is free to apply spending conditions on
libraries, as government funded entities, in order to make value judgments
and choose among activities it seeks to encourage without violating
individual First Amendment rights. If the government is successful in that
effort, CIPA will be subjected to a greatly reduced level of constitutional
scrutiny, requiring only that there be a minimally rational relationship
between the perceived congressional objective (ostensibly to keep children
from accessing harmful materials on the Internet) and the means chosen to
achieve that objective (the application of software filters to public library

328. Bd. ofEduc. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 915 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
329. Kristine M. Cunnane, Note, Maintaining Viewpoint Neutrality for the NEA: National
Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 31 CoNN. L. REv. 1445, 1460 (1999) (citing Rust, 500 U.S. at 200).
330. Bernard W. Bell, Filth, Filteringand the FirstAmendment: Ruminations on PublicLibraries'
Use ofInternet FilteringSoftware, 53 FED. COMM. L.J. 191, 220 (2000).
Given the public library's role as facilitator rather than channel for government speech, the
government should not have the plenary control over the material it makes available to
patrons of a public library in the same way that it may control fora in which the government
seeks to communicate its own message.
Id. at 220.
331. Minarcini v. Strongsville City Sch. Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 582-83 (6th Cir. 1976) ("A library is
a mighty resource in the free marketplace of ideas ... specially dedicated to broad dissemination of
ideas.").

2002]

YOUR MONEY OR YOUR SPEECH

1079

computers).
As discussed in the next section, however, such a view totally
mischaracterizes public libraries and fails to appreciate the manner in
which their patrons use library collections and services to exercise their
rights of private, nongovernmental speech. Because libraries show all
indicia of limited public forums subsidized by the government for the
express purpose of facilitating broad private expression, the Court must
uphold the district court's rejection of a standard that does not
acknowledge the burden on constitutional rights imposed by the conditions
placed on funds in this case. The Court should instead follow Rosenberger
and Velazquez and subject the government's restrictions on the content of
speech in such forums to strict scrutiny. Under this standard of review, the
Court will assess whether the funding restrictions applied to libraries are
"necessary to serve a compelling state interest and ... narrowly drawn to
achieve that end. ' 332 To properly apply strict scrutiny to CIPA, the Court
will necessarily have to examine the nature of public libraries, the
character of Congress's interests in applying the CIPA funding conditions,
the efficacy of the Internet filtering technology to address Congress's
interests without offending the First Amendment, and the existence of
more narrowly tailored and less restrictive alternatives for achieving
Congress's goals.
V. FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS OF

CIPA's FILTERING REQUIREMENT

Two arguments can be made to support the government's view that
Internet filtering in a public library used to limit selected online speech
raises no First Amendment issues that are subject to strict scrutiny. First, it
can be argued that the use of Internet filtering software to restrict selected
online content from being available within the library is no different from
the decisions routinely made by librarians when deciding what materials to
add to their print collections. Second, it can be argued that government
funding of public libraries does not create a forum in which it has an
obligation to subsidize the exercise of First Amendment rights.
A. The Internet Filtering/LibraryAcquisitions Analogy
One of the most important tasks for any library is using its finite
financial resources to acquire books and other materials that both fit its
332. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (citing Carey
v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980)).
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educational and research mission and satisfy the intellectual needs of its
users. The guiding principles of library collection development encourage
librarians to "provide materials and information presenting all points of
view," and admonish them not to exclude materials "because of the origin,
background, or views of those contributing to their creation., 333 However,
financial practicality dictates that a library cannot own everything.
Professional discretion must be applied when deciding what materials to
add or not to add to any library's collection. These decisions are based on
a variety of criteria including cost, compatibility with the rest of the
library's collection, authority of the author, and reputation of the
publisher.334 Most libraries are guided in this process by collection
development policies that are developed by the individual institution 335
to
help define the types of materials that fit within its acquisitions profile.
Theoretically, every title a library adds to its collection has been reviewed
by some member of the professional staff for consideration of its "fit"
within the library's collection plan. 336 Implicit in this process is the
understanding that, as with any process involving human judgments,
librarians undoubtedly make subjective judgments about the content of
available library materials when deciding whether to select an item for
purchase. While it is certainly possible that such subjectivity could lead to
the imposition of personal viewpoint discrimination, such a result is
contrary to the library profession's ethical standards and practices.33 7

333.

AMERICAN LIBRARY ASSOCIATION, LIBRARY BILL OF RIGHTS, available at http://www.ala.

org/alaorg/oif/librarybillofrights.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2002).
334. Am. Library Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 463 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (listing
possible criteria for library selection decisions).
335. Id. at 421 ("Public libraries generally make material selection decisions and frame policies
governing collection development at the local level .... In pursuing the goal of achieving a balanced
collection . . . librarians generally have a fair amount of autonomy, but may also be guided by a
library's collection development policy.").
336. Id. at 463. Libraries regularly use third-party vendors to help them identify materials that fit a
profile of each subscribing institution's interests. Id. Pursuant to what are known as "approval plans,"
the vendors do send libraries selected materials based on their collection development plans, but they
do so on approval. Id. Libraries are still responsible for reviewing selections sent to them on approval
and are free to return titles that they feel do not fit their collection needs. Id. As a result, the principle
that a librarian should review each title that a library adds to its collection holds true even when
approval plans are used. Id.
337. Although not all librarians are members of the American Library Association, that
organization's Library Bill of Rights, Code of Ethics, and Policy Manual provide the guiding
principles at the foundation of Masters of Library Science candidates' training and form the standards
against which professional librarian conduct is measured. Each of these documents includes extensive
guidelines admonishing library professionals against the exclusion of materials because of viewpoint
or controversial content. See American Library Association, LIBRARY BILL OF RIGHTS, adopted as
amended by the ALA Council, Jan. 23, 1980, available at http://www.ala.org/alaorg/oif/
librarybillofrights.pdf ("Materials should not be excluded because of origin, background, or views of
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Regardless of the subjectivity involved in the library selection process, the
courts have deferred to librarians' expertise in this matter and have
subjected these decisions only to rational basis First Amendment
review.338
In comparison, filtering advocates raise an interesting issue when they
argue that a library's decision to exclude Internet materials from its
"online collection" using software filters is no different than the process of
deciding what print materials not to buy for the library's print collection.
Contending that a public library's Internet filtering decisions are
ministerial and discretionary in the same manner that library acquisitions
decisions are, the argument continues that neither of these decisions
implicate First Amendment review so long as they are viewpoint
neutral. 339 The importance of this distinction in the eyes of filtering
advocates lies in the Supreme Court's troublesome plurality decision in
Board of Education v. Pico,340 which held that local school board
discretion was exceeded when its members ordered the removal from
school libraries of books that they adjudged to be "anti-American, antiChristian, anti-Sem[i]tic, and just plain filthy.",341 Certainly, the
government "may not remove books from ... library shelves simply
because they dislike the ideas contained in those books and seek by their
removal to 'prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion.,,' 342 However, the Court did not
choose to expressly extend this same prohibition to a library's acquisitions
decisions, stating that "nothing in our decision ... affects in any way the
discretion of a local school board to choose books to add to the libraries of
those contributing to their creation."); American Library Association, Code of Ethics, adopted by the
ALA Council, June 28, 1995, available at http://www.alaiorg/alaorg/oif/codeofethics.pdf ("We
[librarians] distinguish between our personal convictions and professional duties and do not allow our
personal beliefs to interfere with fair representation of the aims of our institutions or the provision of
access to their information resources."); American Library Association, POLICY MANUAL, § 53.1.11,
available at http://www.ala.org/alaorg/policymanual/intellect.html ("Librarians have a professional
responsibility to be inclusive, not exclusive, in collection development and in the provision of
interlibrary loans. Access to all materials legally obtainable should be assured to the user and policies
should not unjustly exclude materials even if offensive to the librarian or the user.").
338. Id. at 462 (citing Bell, supra note 330, at 225).
339. Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs. of the Loudoun County Library, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 552,
562 (E.D. Va. 1998).
340. 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality opinion).
341. Id. at 857 (quoting a school board press release explaining its actions in removing books
from school libraries).
342. Id. at 872 (quoting West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)). See also
Mark S. Nadel, The First Amendment's Limitations on the Use of Internet Filtering in Public and
School Libraries:What Content Can LibrariansExclude?, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1117, 1122 (2000).
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their schools." 343 The Court went on to explain that its decision to restrict
discriminatory book removals was necessary to prevent the "suppression
of ideas," 344 but it seemed not to recognize the possibility that the same
sort of viewpoint suppression could result from discriminatory book
selection decisions.
It is upon this logical disconnect that filtering proponents have landed
with full force in search of a constitutional principle that exposes Internet
filtering to reduced First Amendment scrutiny. Their argument is that,
because the Pico Court limited its application of exacting constitutional
standards to book removal decisions and chose not to address the
345
constitutional implications of viewpoint-specific acquisitions decisions,
the Court's silence on the issue justifies library viewpoint-neutral
decisions concerning whether or not to acquire information content, be it
books or Internet sites, without regard to First Amendment
considerations.3 46 If filters are viewed as a software tool to help librarians
make decisions about what Internet content to "acquire" for the library,
they argue, why not view the entire process, including the use of Internet
filters, as an acquisitions decision subject only to minimal constitutional
scrutiny?
This argument, however, assumes more about the theoretical
inapplicability of Pico to library acquisitions decisions than the Court's
decision permits. While it is clear that the Pico plurality does place First
Amendment limitations on the discretion of libraries to remove materials
from their collections 347 and specifically refuses to extend this principle to
acquisitions decisions, it would be a mistake to read the Court's silence on
the constitutional implications of a library's selective acquisition of library
materials as precluding a court from doing so in the future. Nothing in the
Pico decision precludes a court from going beyond the bounds of that
holding to review a library's decision not to add materials because they
espouse a particular political, moral, or social orthodoxy. In fact, in his
dissent to the Pico holding, now Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized the
logic of the Court's distinction between selection and removal of
materials, observing that "if 'suppression of ideas' is to be the talisman,
one would think that a school board's public announcement of its refusal

343. Pico, 457 U.S. at 871 (emphasis in original).
344. Id.
345. Id. at 871-72.
346. Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs. of Loudoun County Library, 2 F. Supp. 2d 783, 793
(E.D. Va. 1998).
347. Pico, 457 U.S. at 870-71. The Court stated that this discretion "may not be exercised in a
narrowly partisan or political manner." Id. at 870.
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to acquire certain books would have every bit as much impact on public
348
attention as would an equally publicized decision to remove the books."
By extending the Pico prohibition against viewpoint bias to acquisitions
decisions as Rehnquist and commentators suggest,349 both selection and
removal decisions would be subject to the same constitutional analysis and
would result in identical First Amendment sanctions when viewpoint
discrimination is found. Moreover, there is no logical reason that such
that blocks access to Internet sites on
review could not extend to a policy
350
the same content-based rationale.
Although there is a logical purity to an extension of the Pico analysis to
acquisitions decisions, regardless of whether the items being selected are
in print or electronic format, this argument displays a fundamental
misunderstanding of the basic impediments to its practical application.
Perhaps most daunting is the evidentiary problem of evaluating the
subjective intent of librarians who choose not to purchase a book for a
library collection. As Professor Richard J. Peltz noted: "[I]f officials'
intentions were dispositive, a court would be hard pressed to look inside
the minds of librarians to determine why they acquired one book as
opposed to another."3 Although it is certainly true that removal decisions
can be equally subjective, the actual removal of an item from a library's
collection is typically accompanied by some discoverable evidentiary trail,
such as memoranda recommending removal, cataloging records, and
withdrawal forms.352 In contrast, it is rare, indeed, for individual decisions
not to buy an item for a library collection to be accompanied by any kind
of traceable evidentiary trail. Although there is anecdotal evidence of long
standing that some librarians make selection decisions based on

348. Id. at 916-17 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
349. See, e.g., Richard J. Peltz, Use "The Filter You Were Born With:" The Unconstitutionality of
Mandatory Internet Filteringfor the Adult Patrons of Public Libraries,77 WASH. L. REV. 397, 447
(2002) ("Perhaps significantly, only three of the Justices then on the Court remain there todayStevens, O'Connor, and now-Chief Justice Rehnquist-and the political balance has drifted toward
favoring the Pico dissenters."). See also Nadel, supra note 342, at 1123 ("As a matter of principle...
as Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Pico observed, the prohibition against viewpoint discrimination
should apply as strongly to library purchase decisions as it does to removals.") (citing Pico, 457 U.S.
at 916 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
350. This concept has, seemingly, never been tested judicially. See Nadel, supra note 342, at
1123-24 ("[N]either Westlaw nor the ALA's Office of Intellectual Freedom could recall any court
decision that even considered a First Amendment challenge to a library's decision not to purchase a
book or to accept one as a donation.").
351. Peltz, supra note 349, at 447.
352. See Nadel, supra note 342, at 1124 ("Removing a book from a library generally requires an
explanation usually generating a paper trail, which is normally discoverable evidence.").
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constitutionally impermissible viewpoint criteria, 353 hard evidence of such
intent is almost impossible to find. Pragmatically, the courts recognize that
the process of selection is inherently subjective and that they cannot prove
what is going on in the mind of the librarian selector, so they have chosen
trust their professional judgment in making
to defer to librarians 35and
4
acquisitions decisions.
In addition to these practical considerations, it is clear that those who
would analogize between the operation of Internet software filters and the
judgment of a librarian making book selection decisions fail to appreciate
the significant differences between the processes of book selection and
Internet site blocking. As the two most comprehensive federal court
examinations of library Internet filtering to date, Mainstream Loudoun v.
Board of Trustees of the Loudoun County Library355 and American Library
Association v. United States ("ALA v. United States")356 concluded, much
of that difference has to do with the nature of the Internet itself. As
described above, librarians decide whether or not to add books to a
library's collection on a title-by-title basis. If, for any number of reasons
enumerated in a library's collection development plan, a book is judged
not to be appropriate for purchase, at least there has been a professional
review of the title and a conscious (and hopefully objective) evaluation
353. Morris L. Ernst, the civil liberties lawyer who successfully defended the publishers of James
Joyce's Ulysses from charges of obscenity, said in 1928:
The subterranean censorship may appear in the public library as well .... Do public libraries
attempt to supervise the tastes of their readers by making it a fixed policy not to buy
"objectionable" books? It is a simple expedient and has often been applied. The public
librarian often has the plausible excuse that as the funds of a library are limited, he must pick
and choose, and naturally the more "wholesome" books are to be preferred. He insists that he
is exercising not censorship but the prerogative of free selection. Nevertheless, the character
of this choice is often suspicious.
MORRIS L. ERNST & WILLIAM SEAGLE, To THE PURE... A STUDY OF OBSCENITY AND THE CENSOR

101 (1928).
354. Nadel observes that the courts steer away from delving too deeply into librarians'
discretionary selection decisions, both because they realize the "substantial judicial resources" that
they would expend in trying to establish discriminatory intent and because they understand that the
selection process is inherently subjective. Nadel, supra note 342, at 1125.
355. 2 F. Supp. 2d 783 (1998) (opinion accompanying order denying defendant's motion to
dismiss) [hereinafter Loudoun 1]; 24 F. Supp.2d 552 (1998) (granting summary judgment for plaintiffs)
[hereinafter Loudoun I1]. Both opinions deal with the same controversy in which a group of public
library patrons challenged a Loudoun County, Virginia, library board regulation requiring the county's
libraries to install "site-blocking software" on all of their computers, ostensibly to "block child
pornography and obscene materials (hard core pornography)" and to block material "deemed harmful
to juveniles under applicable Virginia statutes and legal precedents (soft core pornography)." Loudoun
I, at 787 (quoting the challenged Loudoun County Library Board filtering policy).
356. 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (three-judge panel convened under the expedited review
provisions of CIPA to hear library plaintiffs' suit challenging the statute's constitutionality)
[hereinafter ALA v. United States].
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made.357 No such comprehensive review of online content is possible
because of the enormity and uncontrolled growth of the Internet. 358 When
a library obtains Internet access, it provides its patrons with a worldwide
collection of speech by default, much of which it would deem to be of
"insufficient quality" to purchase if in printed form, 359 but which it has no
independent ability to control, or even review, before it arrives. Sight
unseen, a library offering Internet access makes
available a single body of
360
knowledge in a "single integrated system."
The differences between the traditional library collection and the
Internet's unique speech medium, which invites patrons to participate in "a
vast democratic forum" 361 allowing them to speak on "subjects as diverse
as human thought, '362 could not be more stark. Library Internet access
"indiscriminately facilitates" private speech,363 and it cannot be said that
the library can provide any meaningful editorial discretion if it uses a
technology that blindly blocks patron access to materials that the library
has never even seen, let alone evaluated.3 64 Again, citing the unique
characteristics of the Internet not applicable to a library's traditional print
collection, the Loudoun court thoroughly rejected the filtering proponents'
argument that selections made with filters are analogous to library
selection decisions outside the digital environment:
[B]y purchasing one such publication, the library has purchased
them all. The Internet therefore more closely resembles [the]
analogy of a collection of encyclopedias from which [someone has]

357. Id. at 463 (describing the typical process of book selection in libraries).
358. The court in ALA v. United States made findings of fact concerning the estimated size of the
Internet as of late 2001. The court found that "[a]t least 400 million people use the Internet
worldwide," and that "approximately 143 million Americans were using the Internet." Id. at 416.
Although the court found it difficult to be sure about the exact number of Web sites in existence due to
the decentralized nature of the Internet, it cited a 2000 study that put the total number of unique Web
sites at 7.1 million and estimated that this number would grow to approximately 11 million by
September 2001. Id. at 419. The number of Web pages reachable by Internet search engines (referred
to as "indexable" pages) was estimated to be 2 billion, with the indexable Web growing at
approximately 1.5 million pages per day. The court estimated that the size of the "un-indexable"
Intemet could range from two and ten times the size of the indexable Internet. Id. With size and
growth estimates of these proportions, any prospect of effective human review of the content and
quality of more than a minute fraction of the Internet's available content is, at best, a fantasy.
359. See ALA v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 463 ("[W]hen public libraries provide their
patrons with Internet access, they intentionally open their doors to vast amounts of speech that clearly
lacks [sic] sufficient quality to ever be considered for the library's print collection.").
360. Loudoun 1, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 793.
361. ALA v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 464-65 (quoting Reno 11, 521 U.S. at 868).
362. Id. at 465 (quoting Reno II, 521 U.S. at 870).
363. Id. at 464.
364. Id.
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laboriously redacted portions deemed unfit for library patrons. As
such, the Library Board's
action is more appropriately characterized
365
as a removal decision.
It has been pointed out that, in a world dominated by the instantaneous
publications and accessibility of the Internet, the terms "selection" and
"removal" have very little continuing meaning for libraries.366 Filtering
technology fits both functions at once, or not at all, depending on one's
perspective. Indeed, filters could be used to help librarians find Internet
resources that fit a particular patron's content profile. This is the filter used
voluntarily by a professional librarian as a tool to refine information
access for the benefit of his or her patron. Conversely, there is the filter
mandated by the government to block entire categories of content without
benefit of review or evaluation. Recognizing that filters could be used to
bring government censorship of unprecedented proportions to the Internet,
thereby robbing it of its great value as the most democratic means of
exchanging ideas and information ever devised, it is thoroughly
appropriate that the constitutional distinction between library selection and
removal continue as a means of ensuring strict scrutiny of government
attempts to improperly limit access to protected speech online.
B. The Forum Status ofPublic Libraries
Supporters of government-mandated Internet filtering often argue that,
even if strict scrutiny would otherwise apply to filtering decisions, a lesser
standard of review is appropriate in libraries because they are "non-public
forums," requiring the courts to use an intermediate scrutiny standard to
determine if the filtering policy "is reasonably related to an important
governmental interest. ' 367 In this argument, the government concedes that
Internet filtering is "content-based," but it claims that strict scrutiny of
such restrictions applies only to traditional and limited public forums and
not to forums designed only for government speech. 368 The relevant
question is straightforward-are public libraries limited public forums or
nonpublic forums? Arriving at the right standard for public libraries is
complicated, however, by the unique character and tradition of the public

365. Loudoun 1, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 793-94.
366. Peltz, supra note 349, at 474.
367. Loudoun 11, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 561 (describing defendants' argument based in part on Kreimer
v. Bureau of Police, 958 F.2d 1242 (3d Cir. 1992)).
368. See Part IV.B.3 (discussing the constitutional distinction between funding conditions applied
to government speech and those applied to private speech).
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library in the United States.
It is a fundamental First Amendment principle that the "government
need not permit all forms of speech on property that it owns and
controls., 369 However, it is equally well settled that the government's
power to regulate speech, even on its own property, is not unlimited.3 7 °
The amount of control over speech allowed to the government on its own
property depends on the nature of the forum that the government has
created.37'
Although the origin of the public forum doctrine
can be traced back to
at least 1939,372 the modem application of the doctrine is most frequently
attributed to Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators'
Association,373 a 1983 opinion in which the Supreme Court identified three
categories of forums for the purpose of analyzing the degree of protection
afforded to speech.374 The first category is the "traditional forum," such as
sidewalks, streets, or public parks, which have traditionally been used for
public assembly, communication among citizens, and discussion of public
issues.3 75 The second category is the "limited or designated forum," such
as a school board meeting or municipal theater, which are sites on "public
property which the state has opened for use by the public as a place for
expressive activity. 37 6 The final category consists of "nonpublic
forums, 37 7 such as government office buildings,37 8 jails,379 federal military
369. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992) (holding that an
airport terminal is not a public forum for First Amendment purposes).
370. ALA v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 454.
371. Id. at 454 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788
(1985)).
372. The origin of the public forum doctrine is the subject of some scholarly dispute. Some
attribute the term "public forum" to Professor Harry Kalven, Jr., who is said to have coined the phrase
in his 1965 article, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 1.See
Robert C. Post, Between Governance andManagement: The History and Theory of the Public Forum,
34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1718 (1987) (stating that the phrase "public forum" is "traditionally
attributed" to Professor Kalven's article). More typically, however, the concept of "public forum" is
traced back to the Supreme Court's decision in Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307
U.S. 496 (1939), which endorsed the public's historic and constitutional right to use public streets and
parks as places for communication. In that opinion, Justice Roberts wrote that "streets and parks ...
have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used
for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions."
Id. at 515.
373. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
374. Id. at 44-46.
375. Id. at 45 (citing Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. at 515).
376. Id.
377. Id. at 46.
378. Id.
379. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47-48 (1966) (holding that the area around jails is not a
public forum and that public demonstrations need not be allowed because they could compromise jail
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bases, 3 80 or teachers' mailboxes, 381 which are not, by tradition or
government fiat, places designated as forums for expressive activity or
speech by the public.
The state is given wide latitude to invoke content-based regulations on
speech in nonpublic forums if they are "reasonable" and not based on a
speaker's viewpoint. 382 In such an environment, the government is seen as
subsidizing its own message rather than providing funding to facilitate
public speech. 383 For the state to enforce a content-based regulation in
traditional or limited public forums, however, mere reasonableness does
not suffice. In such forums, the regulation must be capable of surmounting
the strict scrutiny standard.38 4 Specifically, the state must be able to show
that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that
interests without unduly
it is narrowly drawn to achieve the state's 385
compromising fundamental constitutional rights.
With the Perry forum distinctions in mind, it is clear that the level of
constitutional scrutiny that any governmental regulation of expressive
activity and speech within a public library will face depends on a judicial
determination of the forum category in which public libraries are placed.
This question has been litigated in the federal courts, and these courts have
concluded that public libraries are, in fact, limited public forums. 38 6 In
Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, the Third Circuit applied a three-part test in
determining whether the public library constitutes a limited public
security).
380. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976) (holding that, unlike traditional public forums,
such as streets and parks, military bases have not been traditionally used for public speech).
381. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
382. U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 131-32, cert. denied,
453 U.S. 917 (1981).
383. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 552, cert. denied, 532 U.S. 903 (2001)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958)).
384. See, e.g., G. Sidney Buchanan, The Case of the Vanishing Public Forum, 1991 U. ILL. L.
REv. 949 (1991).
With respect to a traditional public forum, the Court has stated repeatedly that it will subject
to strict scrutiny any governmental action that restricts speaker access to the forum on a
content-selective basis. With respect to a designated public forum, the standard of review
analysis is exactly the same as in the case of a traditional public forum.
Id. at 953.
385. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46; Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461, 462 (1980).
386. Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, 958 F.2d 1242, 1258 (3d Cir. 1992) ("[A]n application of the
Supreme Court's declarations concerning this issue... confirm[s] that the Library constitutes a limited
public forum, a type of designated public fora."). Loudoun II, 24 F. Supp. 2d 552, 563 (concluding that
the public libraries at issue were limited public forums in light of the government's intentions in
establishing a county library system, their express grant of permission to the public to use the libraries,
and the compatibility of public use in the libraries themselves).
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forum. 387 That test, which was applied in Loudoun388 and will almost
certainly be applied in future cases in which regulation of expressive
activity in a public library has occurred, requires that the following
inquiries be made to determine a library's forum status:
a) Did the government intend to create a limited public forum when it
389
authorized and established the public library system?
b) To what extent has the government limited or restricted access to the
library by the public or allowed the facility to be freely used by "the
3 90
people?
c) Is the nature of the library compatible with the expressive activity
391
and speech that the government's regulation restricts?
As to the question of government intent in establishing the public
library system, Kreimer and Loudoun recognize that public library systems
are typically established by statutes and/or local resolutions that expressly
declare that they exist to provide people with access to information and
ideas. 392 Indeed, libraries have been described as "the archetypal
traditional government-funded loci for acquiring knowledge. 393 An
institution that the government expressly establishes and maintains to
serve as a public forum for the limited purposes of receiving and
communicating information is indicative of a limited public forum as
394
defined by Perry.
On the second question of extent of use by the public, Kreimer and
Loudoun recognize that public libraries are typically established to serve
the public with no restrictions on access based on age, race, religion,
origin, background, or views.395 By opening to the public at large and
choosing not to retain unfettered discretion governing admission, the state
greatly limits its own discretion to restrict access and the type of
expressive activity that the public engages in when using a public
library.39 6 As to this second question, an institution which has been created

387. 958 F.2d 1242, 1259-62 (3d Cir. 1992).
388. Loudoun 11, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 562-63.

389. Id. (citing Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1259).
390. Id. at 563 (citing Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1260).
391. Id.
392.

Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1259; Loudoun I, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 562-63.

393. Bell, supra note 330, at 221 ("If public libraries should be viewed as settings for wideranging inquiry, the First Amendment should greatly restrain public libraries from blocking the
availability of Internet sites.").
394. Loudoun II, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 562; Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1259.
395. Loudoun II, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 563; Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1260.
396. Loudoun II, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 563; Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1260.

1090

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY

[VOL. 80:1025

397
for extensive use by the public is indicative of a limited public forum.
On the final question of the nature of the library's compatibility with
the type of expressive activity that a filtering policy would restrict,
Kreimer and Loudoun found that the receipt and communication of the
wide variety of information made expressly available to the public by
public libraries (e.g., print and computerized resources, including the
Internet if the library offers it) is exactly the type of expressive activity
398
expected of the public by the bodies that established those libraries.
Receiving and communicating information made available in various
forms is completely compatible with the type of expressive activities
such, is indicative of activity
anticipated in a public library and, as
39 9
forum.
public
limited
a
within
protected
The Kreimer and Loudoun conclusions that public libraries are limited
public forums was recently adopted by the three-judge panel making the
initial review of CIPA's constitutionality in ALA v. United States400 and
will be a primary point of contention during the impending Supreme Court
consideration of the district court's opinion. 40 1 The more broadly the

397. Loudoun II, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 563; Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1260.
398. See Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1256 (recognizing that public libraries are "the 'quintessential'
locus for the exercise of the right to receive information and ideas"); Loudoun 11, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 563
("While the nature of the public library would clearly not be compatible with many forms of
expressive activity, such as giving speeches or holding rallies ...

it is compatible with ...

the receipt

and communication of information through the Internet. Indeed, this expressive activity is explicitly
offered by the library.").
399. Kreimer, 958 F.2d at 1260-62; Loudoun II, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 563.
400. 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 457 (E.D. Pa. 2002), probablejurisdictionnoted 123 S. Ct. 551 (2002)
("We are satisfied that when the government provides Internet access in a public library, it has created
a designated public forum.") (citing Loudoun I1, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 563).
401. At least two commentators have taken the position that the Kreimer, Loudoun, and ALA v.
United States courts got it wrong when they pronounced public libraries to be limited public forums
for all purposes. The chief proponent of this view, attorney Mark S. Nadel, suggests that the standard
that better reflects the complexity of a "multidimensional medium" like a library is different depending
on the activity being scrutinized. Nadel, supra note 342, at 1134-38. According to Nadel, libraries'
decisions concerning who should be allowed physical access to the facility fall into the limited public
forum category and, as such, should be reviewed under strict scrutiny because they are not allowed to
be selective in their decision-making. Id. On the other hand, when making decisions about additions to
the library collection over which librarians are granted great deference, Nadel would classify libraries
as nonpublic forums where the government can invoke content restrictions as long as they are
"reasonable" and are viewpoint-neutral. Id. Bernard Bell suggests a similar approach, saying that
"[p]ublic libraries ... are non-public fora, at least from the speaker's perspective .... Librarians
should be free to provide the content they believe is in the best interests of their patrons without the
constraint of considering the interests of the creators of expressive materials." Bell, supra, note 330, at
206. Indeed, if this theory were adopted, it would provide filtering advocates with a back-door
approach to get Internet filters into libraries without subjecting their use to strict scrutiny. In the end,
even if Nadel and Bell's approach were adopted, a library would end up confronting the same nature
of the Internet dilemmas that it now faces. Having invited the public to engage in virtually limitless
speech by offering Internet access, the library has no tools, including filters, that can restrict patron
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government provides access to speech in its facilities, the less deference
the courts will give the government to control that speech; 402 for example,
government use of content-based conditional funding to encourage
"artistic excellence" in publicly funded institutions, such as an
art
museum, 40 3 receives reduced constitutional scrutiny because the
government is not inviting the widest possible range of public speech. On
the other hand, the same type of funding conditions will be subjected to
strict scrutiny in limited public forums where the government is not the
speaker, and where a wide variety of public speech has been invited.40 4
Following this line of reasoning the district court in ALA v. United States
found that by inviting virtually unlimited public access and financing an
online forum in which patrons can speak on an unrestricted range of
topics, government funding of public libraries creates a limited public
forum in which content regulations on particular speech content are
405
subject to strict scrutiny review.
C. CIPA Strictly Scrutinized
Assuming that the Supreme Court does not reverse the district court
and defer to Congress's spending power in setting CIPA funding
conditions, let library filtering be granted equal deference as library book
selection decisions, or allow public libraries to be described as nonpublic
forums, the constitutionality of CIPA will rise or fall on the government's
ability to convince the Court that the statute can survive First Amendment
strict scrutiny. Neither the federal government in ALA v United States nor
the Loudoun County Virginia Library Board in Loudoun I and Loudoun II
were able to carry this burden at the district court level. As a result, the
statutes challenged in those cases were ruled unconstitutional and
permanently enjoined. 0 6 Although the Loudoun case was never appealed,
"access" to that part of the collection without compromising patrons' constitutional right to receive
information.
402. ALA v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 460.

403. Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 576 (1998) (validating a statute
requiring the National Endowment for the Arts to ensure "general standards of decency and respect for
the diverse beliefs and values of the American public").
404. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (denying
funding to student organization publishing a college newspaper with a Christian editorial slant
amounts to viewpoint discrimination).
405. ALA v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 460.

406. See ALA v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 496 (holding that the Federal Communications
Commission and the Institute of Museum and Library Services "are permanently enjoined from
withholding federal funds from any public library for failure to comply with §§ 1712(a)(2) and

172 1(b) of the Children's Internet Protection Act, 20 U.S.C. § 9134(0 and 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6).");
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the Justice Department announced within weeks of the CIPA trial court
decision that it had filed its notice of appeal with the Supreme Court.407
Although the exact wording of a strict scrutiny test varies slightly from
court to court, the general elements remain constant. To survive strict
scrutiny, CIPA's filtering restriction must be: (1) "necessary" and
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest, and (2) the least
restrictive alternative available to serve the government's purpose.408 An
examination of each element and how government mandated library
filtering fits them provides some interesting insights into the practical and
constitutional difficulties facing government attempts to invoke such a
program.
1. Is a FilteringPolicy Necessary to Furthera Compelling State
Interest?
To show that a restriction on speech is necessary to serve a compelling
state interest, the required first step is to establish that the government's
interest is compelling. That burden lies with the government; "the
government interest cannot be taken for granted., 40 9 The compelling
interest asserted cannot be speculative, but must be based upon a real and
demonstrated harm.41 0 Moreover, the government must show a connection
between that harm and the speech it wishes to restrict.4 '
Although there can be little contest that the government has a
compelling interest in protecting children, the government has done little
to show that unfiltered access to the Internet poses a real harm to children
sufficient to justify compromising First Amendment rights. No one argues
that children should not be protected from harm, but when Congress acts
to restrict speech, much of which is protected, and in the process
compromises perhaps the most democratic communications medium in
history by undercutting one of society's most First Amendment-friendly
institutions, constitutional principles require that the government be
compelled to prove that it is attacking an identifiable and remediable harm.
Loudoun II, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 570 (holding that the Loudoun Country Library Board of Trustees is
"permanently enjoined from enforcing its Policy on Internet Sexual Harassment").
407. Appellant's Jurisdictional Statement at 1, United States v. ALA, 123 S.Ct. 551 (U.S. 2002),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2002/2pet/7pet/2002-0361 .pet.aa.pdf ("Notice of Appeal
...was filed on June 20, 2002.").

408.
409.
410.
Whitney
411.

Loudoun 11,24 F. Supp. 2d at 565-67; ALA v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 470-71.
Ross, supra note 7, at 461 (citing, inter alia, Reno I, 929 F. Supp. at 851).
Id. ("Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech.") (quoting
v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
Id. at 460-61 & nn.154-55. See, e.g., Dolan v. City ofTigard, 512 U.S. 374, 387 (1994).
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Regrettably, the development of First Amendment jurisprudence
relative to children's speech rights does not reflect close examination by
the courts of whether purported governmental interests are compelling. As
evidenced in their review of major federal laws passed since the late 1980s
restricting speech content in the name of "protecting children from
harm, 4 2 the courts' examination of the government's compelling interests
has been superficial, at best.41 3 This perfunctory review of the nature of the
government's interest undermines a critical component of the strict
scrutiny test. As described by Professor Catherine J. Ross:
First, it leads to the tacit assumption that the government's
proclaimed interests are virtually immune from scrutiny once the
state invokes the protection of children. Second, it suggests that the
boundaries of the speech from which children must be protected are
virtually limitless ....Third, when courts beg the question of the
nature of the state's interest in regulating speech to shield the
young, they inhibit the development of First Amendment
jurisprudence and lead emerging doctrine astray. Because courts
have not asked the threshold questions required under First
Amendment doctrine, they have opened the door to using children
4 4
as an excuse for the state to intrude upon protected speech ....
In the case of CIPA, the government has asserted little more than a
generalized interest in protecting children from harm assumed to arise
from their viewing of pornography. 41 5 Because reputable research on the
412. See Ross, supra note 7, at 430-3 1, for a review of the Supreme Court's actions in Salle
Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989); Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc.
v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996); and Reno I1,
521 U.S. 844 (1997). See also Reno IV, 217 F.3d at 173
(citing Reno 111,
31 F. Supp. 2d at 495), in which the court paid scant attention to the issue, noting, "It
is undisputed that the government has a compelling interest in protecting children from material that is
harmful to them, even if not obscene by adult standards."
413. Ross, supra note 7, at 431 ("[R]emarkably, in each of these three cases, the Supreme Court
ignored its own dictates by failing to analyze the state's asserted compelling interest. Instead, the Court
readily accepted the asserted interest in passing.").
414. Id. at433-34.
415. As in the Supreme Court's review of earlier statutes, the district court did not put the
government to the test on this point. The court noted that "[o]n its face, CIPA is clearly intended to
prevent public libraries' Internet terminals from being used to disseminate to library patrons visual
depictions that are obscene, child pornography, or in the case of minors, harmful to minors." ALA v.
United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 471. The court passed by the issue of actual harm resulting from
minors' access to "harmful" materials on the Internet with the usual incantation that the interest of
protecting minors is "well-established" and "beyond the need for elaboration." Id. at 471-72. It then
went further, discussing two other potential compelling interests: the court discussed the government's
interest in protecting library patrons from accidental viewing of offensive materials. Id. at 472-74. It
also discussed the state's interest in preventing unlawful or inappropriate conduct. Id.at 474-75.
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subject is limited, the task of proving that exposing children to unfiltered
Internet content will cause them real harm is certainly not an easy
proposition. As at least one court has recognized, what research has been
done in the scientific literature is inconclusive, at best, on the correlation
between exposure of children to sexual material and any resulting harm to
them.4 16
The issue of children's safety while using the Internet has become the
subject of national debate. Fueled by a near constant bombardment of
popular press accounts warning parents of online "dangers, 4 1 7 the image
of the Internet as a playground for sexual predators waiting to entrap
unsuspecting children has become something of a national obsession.
Against this backdrop, rumors become fact, and genuine concerns by
parents and individuals trying to understand the issues and assess actual
dangers are obscured by symbolic gestures of political opportunism and
demagoguery.41 8 While the courts are not immune to political and social
pressure, it is disturbing that they continue to allow the government's mere
assertion of a compelling interest to satisfy the first element of the strict
scrutiny standard without requiring evidence of actual harm.
Even assuming that the government could actually document and prove
real harm to children resulting from exposure to harmful materials on
library computers, the First Amendment's strict scrutiny standard still
requires proof that filtering would, in fact, alleviate this problem in a
direct and material way.4 19 At this point, the technological limitations
preventing filtering software from shielding minors from harmful material
on the Internet while also protecting the First Amendment rights of adults

416. Playboy Entm't Group v. United States, 30 F. Supp. 2d 702, 710, 715-16 (D. Del. 1998)
(finding that the government was unable to present any clinical evidence linking exposure of children
to pornography and psychological harms).
417. Evidence exists of a correlation between press reports that concentrate on negative aspects of
the Internet and how parents feel about the safety of their children online. In a survey of twelve major
newspapers mentioning the Internet and children between October 15, 1997, and October 15, 1998, the
University of Pennsylvania's Annenberg Public Policy Center found that two of every three stories
relating to the Internet and the family concentrated on a narrow range of online problems (most often
sex crimes, pornography, and privacy invasion), while one of every four such stories concentrated on
sexual predators, child pornographers, and other types of sex crimes directly involving children. Half
the number of stories analyzed did portray positive aspects of the Internet, but rarely were those
comments made in the articles reporting problems. The report concludes that often poorly documented
stories stirring parents' alarm about their children's safety on the web help shape the nation's
"conventional wisdom" on the issue. See Joseph Turow, The Annenberg Public Policy Ctr., The
Internet and the Family: The View From Parents, The View From the Press 34-42, available at
http://www.appcpenn.org/internet/family/rep27.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2002).
418. See HEINS, supra note 7, at 243-53.
419. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994).
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are well documented. 420 The most recent, and certainly the most
comprehensive, examination of this technology's inability to operate
within the constraints of the First Amendment was incorporated into the
district court's opinion in ALA v. United States421 and was based on
testimony presented by both
extensive findings of fact gleaned from expert
2
the library plaintiffs and the government.
The court first noted that, because of the enormous size of the Internet,
it is very difficult to quantify the error level of filtering software.42 3
Nonetheless, using testimony presented by the government's expert
witness, the court found that, conservatively, 6% to 15% of the sites
blocked in public libraries analyzed in preparation for trial did not contain
sexually explicit content, as that term is defined in CIPA.424 This finding is
in line with the classic complaint regarding filtering products, that they are
inflexible by their very nature and block sites with harmless content if they
contain "keywords" such as "breast." An example frequently given is the
inability to access a site with instructions for performing a breast selfexamination. Despite manufacturers' claims that refinements in the
technology have allowed more sophisticated filtering, the court still found
multiple examples of inexplicable blocking. A California Jewish
Community Center site, a guide to allergies, and a flyfishing outfitter's site
were all blocked as "pornography," and a Louisiana cancer treatment
facility's site was blocked as "sex., 425 The court observed that incidents of
inappropriate blocking covered a wide range of subject matter, including

420. See generally Christopher Stem, X-Rated Files Finding Child Audience: CongressionalStudy
Calls FilteringSoftware Ineffective, WASH. POST, July 28, 2001, at EO1; Digital Chaperonesfor Kids,
CONSUMER REPORTS, Mar. 2001, at 20; Geoffrey Nunberg, The Internet Filter Farce, AMERICAN
PROSPECT, Jan. 1, 2001, at 28; Joe Salkowski, Web Filters Proving Ineffective But Politicians
Effectively Milking Them, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 30, 2000, at C7; American Civil Liberties Union,
Fahrenheit 451.2: Is Cyberspace Burning? How Rating and Blocking Proposals May Torch Free
Speech on the Internet,published at http://www.aclu.org/issues/cyber/buming.html (last visited Oct. 1,
2002); THE INTERNET FILTER ASSESSMENT PROJECT REPORT, published at http://www.bluehighways.

com/tifap/Leam.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2002).
421. ALA v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d. 401 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
422. The district court closely reviewed the testimony and research studies offered by a number of
experts on filtering technology and actively questioned the methodologies used by both parties to
illustrate the relative effectiveness of Interet filtering. See generally ALA v. United States, 201 F.
Supp. 2d at 430-49 (concluding that "no presently conceivable technology can make the judgments
necessary to determine whether a visual depiction fits the legal definitions of obscenity, child
pornography, or harmful to minors").
423. Id. at 437-42 (criticizing the government witness's attempts to quantify the error rate of
filtering programs).
424. Id. at 448.
425. Id. at 446-47.
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religion, politics and government, health, careers, education, travel, and
42 6
sports.
The reverse problem, that of underblocking, arises in part because of
the size of the Internet, and particularly the portion of the Internet which is
not indexed.427 With more than 50% of Internet content invisible to the
tools used in filtering software to identify sites to be evaluated, the court
recognized that perhaps as many as a billion Web pages, some
undoubtedly containing content that would run afoul of CIPA, could slip
through to viewers having never been filtered.428 In addition, because most
filtering programs are designed to search for suspect text as opposed to
graphic images, 429 they cannot filter out the visual depictions that are the
target of CIPA. While the court realized that image filtering programs
exist, it found that the technology "is immature, ineffective, and unlikely
to improve substantially in the near future.,, 430 Finally, neither automated
nor human review techniques allow sufficient accuracy to ensure that all
Web pages fitting CIPA's definitions of proscribed content will in fact be
found and properly categorized. 43'
The ALA court's ultimate finding regarding the effectiveness of
filtering software was that "any filter that blocks enough speech to protect
against access to visual depictions that are obscene, child pornography,
and harmful to minors, will necessarily overblock substantial amounts of
speech that does not fall within these categories. 432 Because this
technology cannot be used to comply with CIPA without preventing
access to significant amounts of protected speech, the court held that the
use of filters in public libraries "is not narrowly tailored to the
government's legitimate interest in preventing the dissemination of visual
depictions that are obscene, child pornography, or in the case of minors,
harmful to minors. 433
2. Is Filteringthe Least Restrictive Alternative?
It is well established that the state bears the burden of proving that it
has chosen the least restrictive means available to address a compelling

426. Id. at 446.

427.
428.
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.

See supra note 358 for discussion of the term "indexable" as it pertains to the Internet.
ALA v. UnitedStates, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 431.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 436.
Id. at 476-77.
Id. at 478.
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state interest to regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech.434
"Without evidence that less restrictive means had 'been tested over time,"'
the state cannot meet its burden of proving that other arguably less
restrictive means would not be sufficiently effective.4 35 There are, in fact,
many alternatives less restrictive than filtering available and in use in
libraries throughout the nation that greatly limit-the likelihood that library
patrons will use computers to access obscene materials.436
Loudoun handled this issue fully, discussing a number of approaches
that could be tested before filtering could be assumed to be the least
restrictive alternative.437 In ALA v. United States, the court expanded on
the list of possible options that could be. as effective as filtering.
Specifically, it suggested that any of the following less restrictive
alternatives could serve the government's interests and should be
examined for effectiveness before filtering is mandated: 438 Internet use
policies; tap-on-the-shoulder policies (in which librarians visually monitor
Internet screens and alert users when they are viewing what appears to be
unprotected material); requiring minors to use specific computers; placing
computers used by minors in direct view of library staff; requiring minors
to use filtered computers when unaccompanied by parents; offering
patrons the option of using filters; segregating filtered and unfiltered
computers; and use of privacy screens and recessed monitors. 439 Although
both courts found that the alternatives they listed would be less restrictive
than a comprehensive filtering policy, each declined to decide whether
these alternatives would in fact survive constitutional scrutiny if
implemented.44 °

434. Loudoun II, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 564-65; Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
435. Loudoun II, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 566-67 (quoting Sable Comms. of Cal., Inc. v. F.C.C., 492 U.S.
489, 128-29 (1989)).
436. See ALA v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 480 (finding that "there are plausible, less
restrictive alternatives to the use of software filters that would serve the government's interest in
preventing the dissemination of obscenity and child pornography to library patrons"); See also
Loudoun 11, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 567 (finding that Loudoun County's filtering policy "is not narrowly
tailored because less restrictive means are available to further defendant's interests and ... there is no
evidence that defendant has tested any of these means over time").
437. Loudoun II, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 567. Among the alternatives suggested were the installation of
privacy screens around Internet workstations, library staff monitoring of patrons' use of Internet
workstations, the installation of filtering software on workstations placed in a "children only" area of
the library, and the use of content-neutral time limits on Internet workstations. Id.
438. ALA v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 480 (citing United States v. Playboy Entm't Group,
Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) ("If a less restrictive alternative would serve the Government's purpose,
the legislature must use that alternative.").
439. Id. at 480-84.
440. Id. at 482 n.32; Loudoun II, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 567.

1098

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY

[VOL. 80":1025

3. Do CIPA's DisablingProvisions Cure Other Defects?
Congress attempted to ameliorate the lack of narrow tailoring in CIPA
by adding language that allows library officials to disable filters, upon
request, for "bona fide research or other lawful purposes.,, 44' The ALA v.
United States court recognized that the lack of definitional clarity of the
phrase "bona fide research or other lawful purposes" was a cause for
constitutional concern. 442 It concluded, however, that even under the
broadest interpretation of the phrase-allowing access to any speech that
is constitutionally protected for that patron-the statute's requirement that
patrons ask the library for permission to access that speech is contrary to
the First Amendment.443 Like Loudoun before it, which had analyzed a
similar provision permitting citizens to publicly petition for access to
protected speech, the ALA v. United States court recognized that such a
requirement has "an impermissible chilling effect" on First Amendment
rights.444 Library patrons' reluctance to ask permission to engage in speech
that covers a wide range of sensitive subjects, such as sexually related
disease, sexual identity, and certain medical conditions, was likely to deter
many from engaging in this protected speech at all. Even in cases where
these requests could be made anonymously through the transmittal of an email request or other means that would hide the requester's identity, the
court noted that the accompanying delay of this procedure serves as its
own significant burden on patrons' unfettered exercise of their First
Amendment rights.44 5 An additional concern noted in Loudoun and
arguably applicable to ALA v. United States is that requiring individuals to
seek permission from government agents with unfettered discretion to
grant or deny access serves as a prior restraint to protected speech and is
antithetical to the concepts of the First Amendment.44 6
In the final analysis, the ALA v. United States court found that the
disabling provisions do not save the statute, as at best they lessen but do
not eliminate its First Amendment infirmities.

441. See discussion of disabling provisions supra at text accompanying notes 184-88.
442. ALA v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 485.
443. Id. at 485-86.
444. Id. at 486 ("The Supreme Court has made clear that content-based restrictions that require
recipients to identify themselves before being granted access to disfavored speech are subject to no
less scrutiny than outright bans on access to such speech."). See also Loudoun 11, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 569
n.22 (citing Loudoun 1, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 797). Both the ALA v. United States and the Loudoun courts
relied on Lamont v. PostmasterGeneral, 381 U.S. 301 (1965), as the source for this principle. ALA v.
United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 486-87; Loudoun 11,24 F. Supp. 2d at 569-70.
445. ALA v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 487-88.
446. Loudoun 1, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 797.
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VI. CONCLUSION

Congress has made a transparent effort to present its latest attempt to
restrict sexually explicit content on the Internet, the Children's Internet
Protection Act, as a routine use of its broad spending power. Having been
thwarted by the courts in its efforts to tame the Internet through the use of
direct criminal sanctions on online distribution of obscenity and material
that is harmful to minors, Congress attempted to end-run constitutional
roadblocks, forcing libraries to accept government regulations on speech
content or surrender their claim to critically needed federal technology
funds.
When closely examined in the light of First Amendment doctrine,
however, CIPA's funding conditions are revealed to be the
Communications Decency Act and the Child Online Protection Act in
disguise-yet another congressional attempt to eradicate sexual content
from the Internet using technology that inevitably filters out a great deal of
constitutionally protected speech. In CIPA, Congress has demonstrated an
even greater zeal to censor online content. It is willing not only to
compromise the application of the First Amendment's protections to the
Internet, as it had tried to do with the failed CDA and COPA, but is now
willing to achieve its goal by undercutting its own meritorious program to
democratize Internet access by holding public libraries hostage to win its
desired result.
Stripped of the facade of an innocent funding decision, CIPA is one of
the most sweeping restrictions on constitutionally protected speech ever
invoked by Congress. Having struck down the CDA and expressed
concern about the COPA's eventual ability to withstand comprehensive
strict scrutiny analysis, the Supreme Court has made clear that it intends to
fully protect First Amendment rights on the Internet. With CIPA having
lost its initial round of constitutional review, the government is asking the
Court to rescue its latest effort to "protect our children" online. While that
goal is laudable, CIPA's approach is fundamentally flawed. An assessment
of the certain harm to First Amendment rights from enforcement of the
statute's funding conditions, as well as an analysis of the many alternative
ways to achieve the goal at far lower cost to free speech must lead the
Court to reject this approach and send yet another message that the
Constitution will not allow Congress to compromise First Amendment
principles in the online world.

